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The people of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal 
community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of 
the world is felt everywhere. 
Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (1795: 107 – 108) 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation was to explore the question of humanitarian 
intervention’s agency from the theoretical perspective of cosmopolitanism. 
Cosmopolitanism is critical about the role of states in protecting individuals’ rights and 
thus questions whether the world should be organized around sovereign states system. 
In an ideal cosmopolitan world order without sovereign states, there would be no states 
and thus no need to intervene. In the non-ideal world, however, human rights violations 
are still present and thus humanitarian interventions are a necessity. Central to the 
discussion of this dissertation is the dilemma of applying an ideal theory to the 
problems of the non-ideal world. This dissertation sets out to identify the theoretical 
challenges that cosmopolitanism faces when applying its ideal principles to the problem 
of humanitarian intervention. 
The major objective of this thesis was to clarify how cosmopolitans approach the 
issue of right agent for humanitarian intervention. Cosmopolitanism calls for extensive 
reforms in the global order to handle more effectively the question of large-scale 
fundamental human rights abuses present in the imperfect world order. Thus the purpose 
of this thesis is to explore the possible alternatives to the current governance of 
humanitarian intervention from the perspective of cosmopolitanism, by asking who 
would be the most legitimate agent to authorize and undertake a humanitarian 
intervention. With that aim, the thesis identified the premises underlying the 
cosmopolitan conception of humanitarian intervention, and analyzed the arguments of 
the leading contemporary cosmopolitan thinkers and weighed them critically against 
one another. 
The findings of this dissertation suggest that cosmopolitanism provides normative 
guidance for the non-ideal world by (1) establishing the ideal global order and (2) 
offering guidelines to approximate that ideal. As according to cosmopolitanism the 
agents for humanitarian intervention in the real world lack legitimacy, they propose 
reforms to create the ideal agents, which would offer a much more effective protection 
of human rights. However the theoretical exploration conducted in the dissertation 
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suggested that this needs to be approached with caution since there are certain 
limitations involved when applying the ideal theory to the non-ideal world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will explore the question of a right agent for humanitarian intervention 
through the theoretical perspective of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism places 
limitations on the sovereignty of nation-states to secure human rights and global justice, 
by asking the question of whether, and to what extent, sovereign states are still a 
necessary component of a globalized world (Van Hooft 2009: 133). As 
cosmopolitanism questions whether the world should be organized around sovereign 
states system, in an ideal world order without sovereign states, there would be no need 
to intervene. This arises from the cosmopolitan world order, where the world would be 
conceived as a globally inclusive commonwealth, thus an external intervention would 
become impossible. In a non-ideal world, however, grave violations of human rights by 
states are still present and hence humanitarian intervention is a necessary practice. 
Hence, from the cosmopolitan perspective, humanitarian intervention comes under a 
new light. The aim of this dissertation is to clarify how cosmopolitan theories approach 
this issue. 
This question has also a direct impact on problem of legitimate authority for the 
intervention: who should be authorized to decide when a humanitarian intervention is 
needed and who is the right agent to intervene with the sovereignty of another state? 
This is a question about which political agents (state, regional or global governing 
bodies) are entitled to conduct a humanitarian intervention. This thesis will set out to 
compare the contrasting theoretical assumptions about sovereignty, in order to clarify 
the problem of legitimate agency in humanitarian intervention. The wider purpose of 
this paper is to examine the credibility of the cosmopolitan paradigm, regarding the 
internal coherence of cosmopolitan theory. 
Currently there exists a widening gap between the norms governing humanitarian 
intervention and the actual political practice by the international community. This 
contradiction should motivate us to approach those questions through the prism of 
political theory. Cosmopolitanism is a political theory, aims at offering ideal solutions 
to the problems conceived in the real world, thus it offers new institutional principles 
and a new global institutional architecture to secure human rights in the international 
system. However it is important to question whether ideal normative theories can give 
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us feasible guidance for the real, non-ideal world. Thus the purpose of this thesis is to 
explore the possible alternatives to the current regime of governing humanitarian 
intervention from the perspective of the cosmopolitanism theory by asking who would 
be the ideal agent. However this should be approached with caution as there are 
limitations in applying an ideal theory to the current issues and crises. 
The thesis has two main objectives: firstly, to bring out how cosmopolitan ideas can 
be applied to the agency problem of humanitarian intervention and assess the internal 
cohesiveness of the cosmopolitanism theory; secondly, to shed some light on the role of 
normative theories like cosmopolitanism in the field of International Relations (IR). 
With these aims in mind, this thesis will map out the cosmopolitan argument for 
humanitarian intervention. 
The overall structure of the thesis takes the form of five parts. The first part lays out 
the theoretical dimensions and conceptual distinctions of the cosmopolitan theory. 
Chapter two begins by laying out the cosmopolitan critique of Westhphalian statist 
sovereignty and clarifies the cosmopolitan conception and foundation of sovereignty. 
The third chapter is concerned with the ideal cosmopolitan theory framework focusing 
on the three key contemporary theories: Archibugi and Held’s cosmopolitan democracy, 
Habermas’s postnational democracy and Pogge’s vertical dispersion of sovereignty, and 
takes a critical perspective at the institutional models. The fourth chapter maps out the 
non-ideal theory of cosmopolitanism concerning humanitarian intervention and 
establishes why there is a need for a humanitarian intervention according to 
cosmopolitans, and according to which norms and principles it should take place. The 
final fifth chapter presents and interprets the findings of this thesis, and indicates the 
implications of these findings for future research. 
The nature of this dissertation is theoretical, which is limited to the study of 
contemporary cosmopolitanism. The purpose is to analyze how the question of 
humanitarian intervention’s agency is approached from the theoretical framework of 
cosmopolitanism. In this way cosmopolitanism hopes to clarify (1) the cosmopolitan 
approach to the problems in the real world and (2) the role of cosmopolitanism in the 
field of IR. 
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Methodological Approach 
This thesis is a work of political theory, which will set, as the research object, the 
question humanitarian intervention’s agency in the framework of the normative theory 
of cosmopolitanism. Traditionally, the problem of humanitarian intervention’s agency 
has been approached in the just war theory framework, however, there are certain 
drawbacks associated with the use of a theory which is founded on statist bias. The 
main disadvantage of this approach is that it has failed to take into account the changes 
in the international system, where the decision-making authority over questions of war 
and peace has been transferred to the supranational level. Thus for this study, the theory 
of cosmopolitanism is used to explore the issue of humanitarian intervention’s agency, 
as it questions whether the world order should be organized around sovereign states. 
Furthermore, the aim of the thesis is to map out the theoretical framework of 
contemporary cosmopolitanism regarding the issue of humanitarian intervention, and to 
explore its theoretical implications on the practice of humanitarian intervention. The 
thesis will on one hand, identify and outline the key premises underlying cosmopolitan 
conceptions of humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, analyze the arguments 
presented in the respective cosmopolitan theories and compare the contrasting 
standpoints of the leading cosmopolitan thinkers, by weighing them critically against 
one another.  
Moreover, the tensions between the ideal theory and the non-ideal viewpoint within 
different accounts of cosmopolitanism will be explored. A comparative perspective on 
various theoretical views will be related to practice of humanitarian intervention that 
will shed some light on the issues discussed and their implications on the pragmatic 
level in the non-ideal world. Therefore, this study makes an important contribution to 
advancing the knowledge of the field of contemporary cosmopolitanism. 
13 
Problem Statement 
In the statist world order, which dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648
2
, the 
notions of sovereignty and non-intervention have been the constituting basis for the 
international relations system. However with the emergence of the international human 
rights regime in the 20
th
 century, this order, based on absolute sovereignty of nation 
states and the principle of non-intervention, has been undermined. Furthermore, the 
recent revival of cosmopolitanism as an ethical and political project has challenged the 
traditional notion of state sovereignty. 
The cosmopolitan project seeks to transform the Westphalian model of sovereign 
states in favor of a cosmopolitan world order and concerns itself with questions about 
world citizens, global justice, and possibly a world government. Cosmopolitans’ 
commitment to these notions has led to the idea that state sovereignty should be reduced 
or even eliminated. Van Hooft (2009) has argued that due to the cosmopolitans’ 
commitment to the notions of human rights of individuals and global justice, they 
downgrade the importance of the traditional sovereignty of nation states. As one of the 
key issues that contemporary cosmopolitans engage with is the issue of human rights 
violations by the states, they argue that national governments should be circumvented 
and human rights and global justice ought to be instead guaranteed by 
international/transnational institutions and global forms of democracy (ibid.: 121). Thus 
for cosmopolitans humanitarian intervention is a necessary practice for guaranteeing 
individuals’ fundamental rights. 
Traditionally, the normative debate over humanitarian intervention has mainly 
focused on the conditions of justifiability of an intervention while paying less attention 
on the actors that would be best suited for undertaking an action as delicate as this. The 
question about agency (i.e. who can and should intervene) and authority (i.e. who has 
the legitimate authority to determine whether and when interventions take place) has 
important practical implications (Lang 2010: 325). Proper authority is a necessary 
condition for a justified humanitarian intervention, as an intervention can be legitimate 
only if it is authorized by a legitimate body. Thus, interventions that have been 
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 The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 which brought an end to the German phase of the Thirty Years War 
and which entrenched, for the first time, the principle of territorial sovereignty in inter-state affairs (Held 
2005: 77) 
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conducted under proper authority are likely to be considered legitimate in the 
international community
3
. 
These normative questions have great implications on the practice of humanitarian 
intervention, as there exists great confusion about who should be the legitimate agent 
and why a certain agent might be considered legitimate. Various actors have undertaken 
the task of humanitarian intervention in the past: NATO in Kosovo (1999), the UN in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (1999), great power states like USA in Grenada 
(1983) and also secondary power states (e.g. Vietnam in Cambodia 1978, India in East 
Pakistan 1971, Tanzania in Uganda 1979). The practice of humanitarian intervention 
reflects the disorderliness in the current international system. Thus a clearer 
understanding is needed of who should have the authority and responsibility to act in 
order to protect human rights. Which institution(s) should possess power(s) to authorize 
an intervention? Who should be authorized to intervene? Should some global 
institutions be assigned the role of protecting human rights? Or could there be also 
multilateral interventions by state coalitions? Or should unilateral interventions by 
states also be allowed? This thesis will set out to clarify these questions in the 
framework of cosmopolitanism. 
Cosmopolitanism and humanitarian intervention are established research subjects in 
social sciences, however only in recent times has the discussion about the implications 
of the theory of cosmopolitanism on humanitarian intervention taken place and since 
then there are numerous discussions by cosmopolitans about humanitarian intervention 
(Archibugi 2004a; Caney 2005; Fine 2007; Habermas 2007; Pogge 1992a). This thesis 
aims to asses, compare, and contribute to these debates, and will bring out the 
distinctiveness of cosmopolitan thinking about humanitarian intervention. 
From the problem statement above follow the two primary research aims:  
1. To analyze how the cosmopolitan ideas can be applied to the contemporary issues 
such as the agency problem of humanitarian intervention and to investigate the 
strengths and weaknesses cosmopolitanism faces when applying the ideal principles 
to the unideal reality. 
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 International community has been defined by Kaldor (2013: 334) as a „(…) cohesive group of 
governments acting though international organizations“. 
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2. To explore the role of the cosmopolitan tradition of thought in theorizing about the 
problems of our times and ask how normative theories such as cosmopolitanism 
can contribute to the study field of IR. 
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1. COSMOPOLITANISM: THEORY AND APPROACHES 
Historically cosmopolitan ideas date back to the Cynic and Stoic philosophers in the 
ancient world, and later were revived by the Enlightenment thinkers in the eighteenth 
century. A more recent revitalization of the cosmopolitan thought has taken place since 
1989. From then cosmopolitanism has developed into a vibrant and inter-disciplinary 
movement in social sciences with a distinctive research agenda (Fine 2003: 11). The 
object of investigation in this paper will be the normative political theory of 
contemporary cosmopolitanism. 
1.1. Varieties of Cosmopolitanism 
As a normative political theory cosmopolitanism seeks to answer the question how 
the world order ought to be. In contrast to other theoretical paradigms in the IR 
discipline, which have traditionally focused on sovereign states, the maximization of 
state interest, nationality, or securing the power balances between states, 
cosmopolitanism as a political theory is based on the acknowledgement of a notion of 
common humanity that ethically implicates an idea of shared or common moral duties 
toward others by virtue of that humanity (Brown, Held 2013: 1). 
From this ethical consideration are derived cosmopolitanism’s three general moral 
and normative commitments: 1) cosmopolitans believe that the primary unit of moral 
concern are individual human beings, not states or other forms of communitarian or 
political association; 2) cosmopolitans maintain that this moral concern for the 
individual leads into an impartial commitment to respect all human beings equally, 
regardless of the place the person has born and the communal association that person 
happen to be placed in; 3) cosmopolitanism is universal in its scope, maintaining that all 
humans are equal in their moral standing and that this moral standing applies to 
everyone everywhere, as all humans are citizens of the world (Pogge 1992b: 48 – 49). 
This permits us to conclude that cosmopolitanism as a theory can be described as 
individualist, egalitarian, and universal. 
However, as Held (2010: 14) has observed, “just as there is not only one form of 
liberalism or a single way to conceptualize democracy, there is no unified or monolithic 
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understanding of cosmopolitanism”. Cosmopolitan theorists have interpreted those core 
ideas differently, and this has led to wide spectrum of diverse normative ideas and 
ideals within the paradigm of cosmopolitanism. In the contemporary cosmopolitan 
thought it is possible to distinguish between three distinct versions: (a) cosmopolitanism 
as a moral theory (e.g. Appiah 2007); (b) cosmopolitanism as an institutional theory 
(Pogge 1992a); and (c) cosmopolitanism as a theory about justice (Moellendorf 2002). 
Moral or ethical cosmopolitanism endorses the view that all human beings are 
members of a single community and that they have moral obligations to all other human 
beings, as every individual is the ultimate unit of moral worth and equal concern 
(Kleingeld 2013). Political cosmopolitanism (McGrew 2004), also labeled as 
institutional cosmopolitanism (Beitz 1979; Pogge 1992b), advocates the claim that there 
should be global political institutions, which implicates transcending the Westphalian 
notion of sovereignty of the state and forming a transnational governing institution(s)
4
. 
Political cosmopolitans are critical of the current statist order and see it as undemocratic 
and/or hostile towards the realization of cosmopolitan normative principles (Caney 
2010: 150). Thus they emphasize the importance of organized global governance and 
reformed international political institutions in line with the cosmopolitan ideals. 
Cosmopolitan institutions and organizations of regional and global governance are 
considered to be a necessary supplement to those of the state. (Brown, Held 2010: 11)  
Some cosmopolitans (Van Hooft 2009: 8) have argued that moral cosmopolitanism 
implies political cosmopolitanism – that the ideals of moral cosmopolitanism are only 
achievable through institutional cosmopolitanism. This would mean that only through 
the institutionalization of global governance institutions can all individuals enjoy equal 
moral consideration. Others like Beitz (1994: 124) and Tan (2010: 182) have argued 
that moral cosmopolitanism does not entail commitment to political cosmopolitanism. 
According to those thinkers, unlike political cosmopolitanism, which calls for 
establishment of global governing institutions, moral cosmopolitanism does not 
necessarily advocate institutional demands (Tan 2010: 182 – 183). 
                                                 
4
 Waldron (2000: 228) has described this cosmopolitan political ideal as an utopian ideal of a polis or 
polity constructed on a world scale, rather than on the basis of regional, territorially limited states. 
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The three cosmopolitan core principles introduced above (Pogge 1992b: 48 – 49) are 
constitutive of both moral and political cosmopolitanism; however it is important to 
understand that moral cosmopolitans are not necessarily committed to any institutional 
claims made by political cosmopolitans. For the sake of clarity and order it is important 
to make a distinction between the two theories because on the theoretical level they 
have very different focuses and therefore should be considered analytically and 
practically separate. Table 1 (Dower 2009: 63) presents, as a matrix, the theoretical 
contrasts between ethical and institutional cosmopolitanism in the individual and state 
level
5
. On the one hand, ethical cosmopolitanism conceives the individual as a „citizen 
of the world“ and is concerned with the universal moral values shared by all individuals 
and the rights and duties that each of them have to the others globally. On the other 
hand, the institutional cosmopolitanism on the individual level is concerned with the 
global citizenship as embedded in the global institutions – what would make individuals 
global citizens as opposed to simply globally concerned moral agents. Cosmopolitan 
ethics applied to the states and international relations is concerned with the ethical 
issues, however institutional cosmopolitanism on the state-level focuses on institutions 
of global governance that are necessary for the realization of the cosmopolitan vision. 
(Dower 2009: 61 – 63) 
Table 1 Four Dimensions of Cosmopolitanism (Dower 2009: 63) 
 ETHICAL INSTITUTIONAL 
INDIVIDUAL Global citizenship as a 
commitment to a global 
ethic or possession of a 
universal moral status 
Global citizenship as embedded in global 
civil society, cosmopolitan democracy, 
globally oriented citizenship, 
international human rights law, etc. 
STATE Ethics of international 
relations from a global 
ethics point of view, hence 
generally a critique of 
international relations 
Proposals for (new forms of) global 
governance, a new global political order, 
a neo/post-Westphalian order, stronger 
international institutions, cosmopolitan 
law, world government 
 
Justice-based cosmopolitanism or global justice cosmopolitanism is concerned with 
the cosmopolitan conceptions of civil and political justice and distributive justice. The 
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 Ethical cosmopolitanism is considered as a variant of moral cosmopolitanism understood in terms of 
global ethics, that endorses claims about trans-boundary obligations (Bernstein 2012: 715; Dower 2009: 
63) 
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main argument of the proponents of this version of cosmopolitanism is that there exist 
global principles of justice that apply to all individuals and hold that the duties of 
distributive justice extend across borders. Arguments like these have been defended by 
Beitz (1979; 1999), Pogge (2011) and Moellendorf (2002) who have argued that the 
duties of justice exist between persons globally and not merely between compatriots. 
The cosmopolitan conception of distributive global justice is intrinsically linked to 
moral cosmopolitanism which considers individuals as the ultimate units of moral worth 
and therefore entitled to equal and impartial concern regardless of nationality. However 
it is not evident that cosmopolitan ideas of justice necessarily imply commitment to 
claims of cosmopolitan institutional models. For example Tan (2010: 182 – 183) has 
argued that „cosmopolitan justice does not call for a world state, even though its 
principles are to regulate and determine the justness of institutions“. 
For reconstructing the cosmopolitan argument for humanitarian intervention, it is 
necessary to consider the ethical, justice-related and institutional claims that 
cosmopolitans form as a complex whole, where each pillar supports the other argument. 
However, the central focus of this dissertation is on political cosmopolitanism as the 
aim is to analyze the concrete institutional solutions offered by cosmopolitans on the 
humanitarian intervention agency issue. These cosmopolitan proposals of various types 
of global governance may range from fairly modest proposals for improving the way the 
international system works, to proposals for world government, with various positions 
in the middle, as the proper institutional recognition of the role of global civil society in 
proposals for cosmopolitan democracy (Dower 2009: 62)
6
. 
1.2. The Current State of the Field 
The theory of political cosmopolitanism concerns itself with normative questions 
about international political and institutional structures, and argues for some form of 
                                                 
6
 The idea of “governance without government” implies that global governance needs to be distinguished 
from global government: „(...) government suggests activities that are backed by formal authority, e.g. by 
police powers to insure the implementation of duly constituted policies, whereas governance refers to 
activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed 
responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain 
compliance“. In this way it is possible to conceive of governance without government – of regulatory 
mechanisms in a sphere of activity which function effectively even though they are not endowed with 
formal authority. (Rosenau 2000: 4 – 5) 
20 
post-Westphalian global order. The theoretical inquiry in this field has focused on what 
political structures should exist and asks whether there should be a world state, a global 
cosmopolitan democracy, a minimal federation of cosmopolitan states, a global 
republican cosmopolitan order, or some other middle-ground system of global 
governance (Brown, Kime 2010: 454). For example, Pogge (1992b) supports an 
institutional cosmopolitanism with vertical dispersion of sovereignty, Held (2005, 2012) 
and Archibugi (2009) advocate a cosmopolitan democracy and Habermas (2007) argues 
for a postnational constitutional cosmopolitanism. It is easy to see that, within the 
cosmopolitan paradigm, there is great disagreement about the extent of sovereignty that 
states should retain. 
The contemporary literature about humanitarian intervention has emerged in the 
context of the post-Cold War world, where there has been intensification of 
humanitarian interventions, and controversial cases that have been labeled humanitarian 
intervention (e.g. Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq). The focus of the normative 
discussions about humanitarian intervention is dominated by the questions of morality 
and justifiability, however in the normative theory of cosmopolitanism the issue comes 
under a new light. One the one hand, cosmopolitan theory should not have anything to 
say about humanitarian intervention, as in an ideal world order without states there 
would be no need to intervene (Lang 2010: 331). Humanitarian intervention involves 
the violation of state’s sovereignty, which in an ideal cosmopolitan world would be 
transferred to the global level, thus rendering an intervention impossible. On the other 
hand, cosmopolitans recognize that in the non-ideal world the principal agents of the 
international system are still sovereign states and as a response they have developed a 
non-ideal (normative) theory for addressing the issues of the imperfect real world. 
The debate about the humanitarian intervention among the cosmopolitan thinkers is a 
rapidly growing area of study, with substantial amount of literature. Notable authors 
have been Archibugi „Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention“ 
(2004a); Held „Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to 
Cosmopolitan Governance“ (2005) and „Principles of Cosmopolitan Order“, Pogge 
„Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty“ (1992b) and “An Institutional Approach to 
Humanitarian Intervention” (1992a), James Pattison “Humanitarian Intervention and the 
Responsibility To Protect: Who Should Intervene?” (2010) and Simon Caney „Justice 
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Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory“ (2005). However the literature shows no 
consensus on the question of right agency of humanitarian intervention within the 
current debate among cosmopolitans, as there seem to be substantially different 
perspectives and ambivalences within the cosmopolitan paradigm on that question. This 
thesis sets out to compare the contrasting theoretical assumptions about humanitarian 
intervention in order to clarify the issue. 
Within the literature of cosmopolitanism it is possible to distinguish between the 
theorists that defend a moderate model of cosmopolitanism that argue for reforming the 
current international order (Habermas and Pogge), contrasted to the defenders of a more 
radical cosmopolitanism who argue for fundamental changes in the global order, as the 
establishment of cosmopolitan democracy (Archibugi and Held). Habermas (2007) 
defends a model of global constitutional democracy, which proposes multilevel system 
of global governance without a global government. In a similar vein, Pogge (1992b) 
argues for an institutional cosmopolitanism with vertical dispersion of sovereignty, thus 
also rejecting the idea of a world government with ultimate sovereign powers and 
authority. In contrast, the defenders of cosmopolitan democracy model (Archibugi 
2009, Held 2005) propose a form of cosmopolitan democratic governance with 
centralized global institutions.  
It is important to systematically analyze the differences between the conceptions of 
ideal global governance and their implications on the world order. In the following 
chapter the tensions between those contrasting theoretical approaches among 
cosmopolitans will be viewed in a comparative perspective and the implications that 
those theories have on the questions of humanitarian intervention’s agency will be 
considered in detail. This thesis hopes to contribute to clarifying this highly important 
issue by exploring the possible applications of cosmopolitan idea(l)s on the practice of 
humanitarian intervention. 
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2. SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN 
APPROACHES 
The cosmopolitan argument for humanitarian intervention derives from its core 
principles presented in the first chapter. Commitment to the principles of individualism, 
egalitarianism, and universality indicates that the protection of the fundamental rights of 
human beings is at the core of the cosmopolitan project. Fine has offered the following 
explanation of the relationship between cosmopolitanism and human rights: 
“cosmopolitanism imagines a world order in which the idea of human rights is a basic 
principle of justice and in which mechanisms of global governance are established for 
the protection of human rights” (Fine 2007: 3). 
Cosmopolitanism considers human beings to be (cosmopolitan) world citizens, and 
thus postulates individual human beings as the primary political agents (Held 2002: 1). 
Fine has argued that the cosmopolitans’ concern with the rights and responsibilities of 
world citizens results in addressing the problem of states as the greatest human rights 
violators: 
The practice of humanitarian military intervention goes to the heart of 
cosmopolitans’ aims to defend human rights and it raises searching 
questions about whether and how individuals can be safeguarded against the 
murderous actions of their own governments. (Fine 2007: 79) 
For cosmopolitans, in order to be a legitimate authority, the holder of sovereignty 
must respect the fundamental human rights of its people. In this sense human rights are 
primarily “obligations incumbent upon the nation state” (Andreson-Gold 2001: 45). 
However, cosmopolitans take the commitment to ensure individuals a range of 
fundamental rights, even when the state is violating them or is not capable of defending 
them (Archibugi 2009: 187). 
Traditionally, the statist global system has encouraged the pursuit of national interest 
in global affairs over considerations of morality and justice. This is widely criticized by 
cosmopolitans who argue for new institutional solutions which would facilitate a 
pathway towards a more moral and just world order
7
. This understanding has led to a 
                                                 
7
 Held has expressed this critique in the following way: “the modern system of nation-states is a limiting 
factor which will always thwart any attempt to conduct international relations in a manner which 
transcends the politics of the sovereign state” (Held 2005: 75). 
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normative debate concerning whether the world would be a more just and peaceful 
place if comprised of sovereign states or would the world be better off if state 
sovereignty were reduced or even extinguished (Van Hooft 2009: 121). As it is usually 
states that go to war for their national interests and it is usually the national 
governments that oppress their people, cosmopolitans in this respect argue “that 
national governments should be bypassed and human rights and global justice secured 
by transnational institutions or by global forms of democracy” (ibid. 121). As 
cosmopolitans support the latter argument, this consideration motivates the necessity to 
redefine the classical conception of sovereignty and fundamentally reorganize the 
international system so it would align with the cosmopolitan principles of morality and 
justice. 
The purpose of this chapter is to address the cosmopolitan literature on the issue of 
sovereignty. Firstly, it begins by elaborating on the cosmopolitans’ critique of the 
traditional conception of sovereignty. Then it moves on to map out the cosmopolitan 
conceptions about sovereignty and its implications on the world order. Thirdly, it argues 
that “cosmopolitan sovereignty” is based on a specific type of sovereignty, which is 
popular sovereignty. 
2.1. The Critique of Sovereignty in the Cosmopolitan Theory 
Central to the contemporary political thought and political reality is the idea of the 
autonomous territorial sovereign state as the principal mode of political organization. In 
the horizontal dimension, sovereignty is currently divided between various branches; 
however on the vertical dimension sovereignty is heavily concentrated at a single level, 
which is the state. From the perspective of cosmopolitanism, this concentration of 
sovereignty at the level of the state is no longer defensible. (Pogge 2005: 178) This has 
been expressed well by Held who argues that in the cosmopolitan framework the state 
will not be “the sole center of legitimate power within their borders”, and the role of the 
state will need to be relocated within this overarching cosmopolitan framework (Held 
2012: 100 – 101). Thus cosmopolitans offer alternative models of global order, where 
sovereignty has been divided on the horizontal and vertical level to be better suited for 
the globalized era and to respond more effectively to global problems. 
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Cosmopolitans in general tend to agree that the concept of sovereignty needs to be 
redefined (Held 2005, Habermas 2010, Archibugi 2009, Pogge 2005): in the core of the 
cosmopolitan political project is the redefining and reconceiving of the traditional 
notion of state sovereignty and legitimate political authority, in a manner that 
disconnects it from its traditional territorial attachment and rearticulates it in 
cosmopolitan democratic arrangements and cosmopolitan law in various political levels. 
However they differ in answering the question whether sovereignty should be 
superseded completely or dispersed, and if the latter is supported, how sovereignty 
should be dispersed and if there should exist a world sovereign. This is an extremely 
important question as sovereignty defines who should be the rightful political authority 
in the international system. 
Cosmopolitans consider the nation-states already under pressure of losing their 
absolute sovereignty that they have enjoyed without threat until recently. The growing 
interdependences in globalized networks, international regimes, global and regional 
organizations (UN, EU, OSCE, NATO etc.) in particular areas which used to be within 
the sovereign domain of the nation state, have made the state lose some of its sovereign 
authority already. Van Hooft has supported the idea that state sovereignty is less 
complete today than it was in the recent past: 
Given the complexity of international arrangements and agreements, 
given the greater power that some states have to influence others, and given 
the capacity of multinational business corporations to pressure national 
governments, the actual power that many states have to order their internal 
affairs and to secure their safety and advantage in the international sphere is 
dramatically less than it used to be (Van Hooft 2009: 120). 
Cosmopolitans argue, however, that sovereignty should be dispersed even more in 
order to: (1) respond adequately to the complex cross-border global issues and to (2) 
realize the cosmopolitan ideals. This idea is based on the distinction between how the 
international system is and how it ought to be. The former argument is concerned with 
the necessities of changing empirical reality, whereas the latter is based on normative 
considerations of cosmopolitanism. In the following those two arguments will be 
considered in detail. 
The first argument against the statist order begins with the critique of the traditional 
regimes of sovereignty, where nation states used to handle the issues which spilled over 
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the boundaries of the state by pursuing national interests which were backed by coercive 
means (Held 2002: 35). However, in the modern world of „overlapping communities of 
fate“, this power logic is simply inappropriate to resolve the complex issues on a global 
scale (Held 2005; 2010). Nowadays the sovereign state system is unable to achieve the 
necessary cooperation and coordination to solve the global problems (Caney 2010: 
159), which creates an “efficiency gap”. For example, the UNSC can declare a 
humanitarian emergency however no state is willing to react. One can consider the 
failure of international community to stop large-scale human rights violations: in the 
case of the Rwandan humanitarian crisis in 1994, where the UNSC declared a state of 
emergency, yet no state was willing to intervene for protecting the human rights of the 
suffering people. The UNSC resolution 912 (1994) appealed “(…) to the international 
community to provide increased humanitarian assistance commensurate with the scale 
of the human tragedy in Rwanda”, however no state or a coalition of states were 
prepared to act. This exemplifies the gap between the states that have retained the 
monopoly of coercive means and the global institution established by them for 
protecting human rights, which is not equipped with the necessary powers. Thus issues 
of global proportions that affect the citizens of all nations either directly or indirectly 
can no longer be addressed by states alone (Beardsworth 2011: 41). Held has referred to 
this as „the paradox of our times” which means “the collective issues we must grapple 
with are increasingly global and, yet, the means for addressing these are national and 
local, weak and incomplete” (Held 2012: 4). Thus the division of sovereignty is 
considered necessary to respond adequately to the complex cross-border global issues. 
The argument for the division of sovereignty continues by analyzing the empirical 
reality of international affairs. Held (2005: 135) has argued that the 
“internationalization” of domestic activities and an intensification of decision-making in 
international and transnational frameworks has eroded the powers of the modern 
sovereign state. Thus sovereignty is divided between the national, regional, and 
international levels and the state has lost its absolute decision-making authority in some 
of the classical domains of the state (e.g. monopoly of violence, regulating control over 
economy etc.). This reflects the fact that while sovereignty has formally remained intact 
in the process of globalization, the growing interdependence between countries 
challenges the traditional role of the nation-state. Held has summarized this idea in an 
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argument that political authority and forms of governance are already dispersed 
“below”, “above”, and “alongside” the nation state: 
First, the way processes of economic, political, legal, military and 
cultural interconnectedness are changing the nature, scope and capacity of 
the sovereign state above, as its regulatory ability is challenged and reduced 
in some spheres; secondly, the way regional and global interconnectedness 
creates chains of interlocking political decisions and outcomes among states 
and their citizens, altering the nature and dynamics of national political 
systems themselves; and, thirdly, the way local groups, movements and 
nationalism are questioning the nation-state from below as a representative 
and accountable power system (Held 2005: 267). 
As in the current international order, the decisions are already made above and below 
the nation-state, it is possible to argue that sovereignty should also be formally 
dispersed between the local, regional and global levels so that decisions taken on those 
levels would be equipped with the necessary legitimacy. Thus the idea of governance 
beyond the nation-state has been made possible through various regional, international 
and global level regimes, that seek to compensate for the nation-state’s lost capacities in 
some functional spheres (Habermas 2001: 70). In this sense the claims made by 
cosmopolitans about the division of states’ (absolute) sovereignty in order to achieve a 
more legitimate global order, is not just an abstract political ideal, but also a response to 
transformations which are already taking place in the international system. 
For cosmopolitans the underlying rationale for the division of sovereignty is that 
decision-making should take place at the appropriate level. Held has explained this as 
follows: 
Recognizing the complex structures of an interconnected world, political 
cosmopolitanism views some issues as appropriate for delimited (spatially 
demarcated) political spheres (the city, state or region), while it sees others 
(…) as needing new, more extensive institutions to address them. (Held 
2012: 106) 
In a similar vein, Pogge (2005: 181 – 189) has argued that a vertical division of 
sovereignty is necessary in order to respond to the global issues (proliferation of 
nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional weapons of mass destruction; reducing 
state’s oppression and violation of human rights; address the global economic injustices; 
environmental degradation; and increasing the democracy of the current world order 
and political representation) at the global level. In order to effectively approach these 
international problems Pogge also argues, that a process of substantial centralization of 
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authority at the global level and a simultaneous decentralization, away from the 
currently dominant level of the state, towards a multi-layered global order is required 
(ibid. 2005). Therefore according to the cosmopolitan conception, states’ sovereignty 
should be retained, but limited to decision-making with regards to lower-level issues; 
whereas the transnational problems should be dealt at the appropriate supranational 
level
8
. 
The second argument is normative, according to which sovereignty should be 
divided even more in order to realize the cosmopolitan ideals. On the one hand, 
cosmopolitans emphasize the intrinsic value of divided sovereignty as a safeguard 
against oppression. On the other hand, cosmopolitans consider a division of sovereignty 
necessary for citizens’ to pursue their interests at various institutional levels. 
This cosmopolitan argument for the division of sovereignty is based on the success 
of the federal model (Archibugi 2013: 321; Pogge 2005: 179), where sovereignty is 
divided on the horizontal level to create a separation of powers and a system of checks 
and balances, in order to avoid any branch of governance having excess power. 
Contemporary cosmopolitans argue for supplementing this horizontal division with a 
vertical division of sovereignty, however this cosmopolitan model is “more centralized 
than the confederal model but less centralized than the federalist model” (Archibugi 
2013: 325)
9
. Cosmopolitans are cautious about creating a world state and thus argue that 
it is important to avoid too extensive concentration of sovereignty on the global scale 
(especially of coercive means), as this could turn oppressive for the people (ibid. 325). 
A vertical division of sovereignty would allow creating a system of constraints on the 
political institutions, which would allow a better human rights protection system on the 
global scale. 
                                                 
8
 Cosmopolitans argue for superseding of state’s sovereignty to a certain extent: the state’s sovereignty 
would nominally exist, however in essence would be reduced. This can be related to Berg and Kuusk’s 
(2010) concept of empirical sovereignty. They argue that sovereignty has different aspects that should and 
can be measured. In the measurement of sovereignty, apart from the legal aspects (recognized or not 
recognized) also empirical aspects, such as the actual operational capability, should be taken into 
consideration when measuring sovereignty. Empirical attributes of statehood would reveal the exercise of 
sovereignty in practice. 
9
 Contemporary cosmopolitans follow the Kantian model, which refers to a model of global governance 
that distinguishes itself from the world state model. Kant argued for a confederism in international affairs 
on the grounds that a world state of all peoples is an impractical and potentially dangerous objective. He 
considered a world state impractical as states are unlikely to completely surrender their sovereignty, and 
the territory is too extensive to be governed by one authority. (Held 2005: 229 – 230) 
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Cosmopolitans have furthermore argued that „(…) the nation-state and the 
international governance structures are often ineffective and lacking in accountability 
and democratic legitimacy“ (Held 2012: 17). They criticize the existing institutional 
order – both at the state level and international level – as unaccountable and suffering 
from a democracy deficit as the people (as stakeholders) are not involved in the 
decision-making process. For cosmopolitans, the principles of self-determination and 
self-governance of peoples have intrinsic value: they argue that people should have the 
possibility to participate in the management of global matters. This involves both the 
internal dimension – citizens effective participation in the choices affecting their own 
political community –, and external dimension – the absence of external domination 
(Archibugi 2013: 313). 
This section has analyzed the cosmopolitan critique of state sovereignty and has 
argued that: 1) cosmopolitans conceive sovereignty as already divided between various 
political levels and argue that this should also be instituted formally; 2) the division of 
sovereignty has intrinsic value as it would render the global order more democratic. 
Based on these empirical and normative arguments they argue that the sovereignty of 
the state should no longer be unitary, but diffused in a multilayered governance system. 
Having defined the content of the cosmopolitan criticism of sovereignty, I will now 
move on to discuss how cosmopolitans construe the different aspects of sovereignty. 
2.2. Sovereignty: Cosmopolitan Conceptions  
In order to elaborate on the questions of what kind of political institutions should 
there be, and who should be the agent to undertake humanitarian intervention it is 
necessary to understand the changing nature of sovereignty – a core concept of the 
current international system. 
The sovereign states system has been the fundamental organizing principle of the 
international system since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the international system has changed considerably since then, “many of the 
assumptions underpinning it are still operative in international relations” (Held 2005: 
78). In this traditional understanding of sovereignty, the principle translates into (1) 
nation state’s freedom from external authority structures interference with its internal 
affairs, and (2) state’s supreme authority and control in its internal affairs. For example 
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Keohane (2003: 282) has briefly formulated these aspects as part of a “classic unitary 
conception of sovereignty, where sovereign state exercises both internal supremacy 
over all other authorities within a given territory, and external independence of outside 
authorities”. In the cosmopolitan framework this conceptual division of external/internal 
sovereignty is problematized. 
Cosmopolitans argue that sovereignty has lost its classical meaning in both external 
and internal aspects: (1) from one hand, external sovereignty has become associated 
with the capability and willingness to take equal part in the collective efforts to solve 
global and regional problems in the framework of international or supranational 
organizations; (2) from the other, internal sovereignty has been extended beyond 
maintaining law and order, to the protection of the rights of the citizens (Habermas 
2010: 70). This reflects the idea that the concepts of external/internal sovereignty have 
been stretched beyond their classical meaning and that the conditions for retaining 
legitimacy have also changed. From the other side, cosmopolitans consider the 
conceptual distinction between external/internal sovereignty as no longer tenable due to 
the effects of globalization and the general internationalization of post-Cold War inter-
state relations (Hehir 2010: 73). Within the international community, the international 
regimes and organizations that govern the areas that once were in the absolute domain 
of sovereignty of the state have transformed and limited the sovereign powers of states 
with respect to both external and internal sovereignty. Thus cosmopolitans argue that a 
great part of the sovereignty has already been transferred from the national to the global 
level, thus rendering the dichotomous understanding of sovereignty void. 
Another important shift in the conceptualization of sovereignty has taken place. As 
discussed above, traditionally the principle of sovereignty has implied state’s external 
independence from non-interference, so it could pursue preferred policies internally 
without any constraints. Pattison (2010: 2) has described this principle sovereignty as 
authority. Sovereignty as authority gave the state a legal and normative barrier against 
interference from outsiders and also gave the sovereign free hands in how they treat the 
citizens. However in the 21 century there has been an important turn in thinking about 
sovereignty. With the rise of the standing of the human rights in the international 
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community, the concept of sovereignty has been redefined as responsibility
10
 – the 
responsibility to protect citizen’s fundamental human rights. (Pattison 2010: 3). 
Sovereignty defined in terms of responsibility brings out the conditional nature of 
sovereign’s legitimacy with respect to human rights. Cosmopolitans in particular have 
supported the idea that sovereignty should be understood in terms of responsibility: 
Sovereignty can no longer be understood in terms of the categories of 
untrammeled effective power. Rather, a legitimate state must increasingly 
be understood through the language of democracy and human rights. 
Legitimate authority has become linked, in moral and legal terms, with the 
maintenance of human rights values and democratic standards. (Held 2002: 
17) 
Thus at the heart of the cosmopolitanism project is the redefinition of sovereignty as 
responsibility – sovereignty must be understood as dependent and conditional upon 
human rights. Hence for cosmopolitans, human rights also offer protection against 
sovereignty – understood as arbitrarily and violently exercised excessive power by the 
state – and impose respective responsibilities on states for protecting those rights. 
However, from a cosmopolitan perspective, it is not only domestic or international 
political institutions that have a responsibility to respond to a politically induced 
humanitarian disaster, but everybody, in their various individual, collective and 
institutional capabilities (Lu 2006: 129). Dower (2009: 179) has agreed that there has 
been a shift from thinking human rights as being universal rights to considering them as 
universal rights with correlative significant transnational (cosmopolitan) 
responsibilities. In this way cosmopolitans seek to widen the circle of responsibility for 
the protection of human rights. However the question about who exactly should have 
this responsibility to protect in the cosmopolitan conception remains unclear. 
According to the cosmopolitan ideal, states’ sovereignty should be superseded 
(Archibugi 2013: 319), however they diverge on the question with what exactly should 
sovereign states’ system be replaced with. From the cosmopolitan perspective there are 
two possible alternative political frameworks to the statist international order: a world 
state or a dispersion of sovereignty. The former represents a centralized global 
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 The concept was first documented in a report by the ICISS (2001) „The Responsibility to Protect“ 
commissioned by the Canadian government. The document argues that a state has the responsibility to 
uphold its citizen’s human rights. If it is unable or unwilling to fulfill the responsibility, the sovereignty is 
temporarily suspended and the responsibility is transferred to the international community. (ICISS 2001)  
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government where there would exist an absolute world sovereign; the latter a 
multilayered system of global governance, which implies a dispersion of sovereign 
authority away from the state. A common misunderstanding about cosmopolitanism is 
that it implies a world government
11
. Instead most political cosmopolitans argue that, 
“prospective global democracy is best envisioned not in terms of a formal world 
government or state, but instead as a system of multilayered global governance resting 
on an unprecedented dispersion of decision-making authority” (Scheuerman 2013: 2)12. 
This constitutes the core of “cosmopolitan sovereignty”:  
Cosmopolitan sovereignty comprises networked realms of public 
authority shaped and delimited by cosmopolitan law. Cosmopolitan 
sovereignty is sovereignty stripped away from the idea of fixed borders and 
territories governed by states alone, and is instead thought of as frameworks 
of political regulatory relations and activities, shaped and formed by an 
overarching cosmopolitan legal framework. (Held 2002: 33) 
The idea of a world state contradicts with what these theorists are trying to achieve 
by the dispersion of sovereignty – to avoid the traditional concentration of sovereignty 
on one level, which may turn oppressive. Thus cosmopolitans believe that massive 
human rights violations can be prevented by the dispersion of sovereignty. The 
“cosmopolitan sovereignty” defended by the cosmopolitan theorists, would in this sense 
consist in the protection of every individual, regardless of nationality, through a 
network of overlapping institutions of legitimate governance (Thomas 2004: 5). 
The traditional notion of Westphalian state sovereignty has been challenged and 
constrained by cosmopolitans on the empirical and theoretical level: on one side, the 
changing nature of the international system due to the process of globalization has 
eroded the sovereign state’s authority in the domains traditionally under the 
government’s control; on the other side, normative theories like cosmopolitanism 
question whether this is the best form of governance of the international system and 
search for an alternative to the system of sovereign states. 
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 Many cosmopolitans actually argue that “(…) there is no guarantee that a world government would be 
more orderly, secure, accountable and legitimate than previous forms of political organization” (Held 
2005: 137 – 138). 
12
 This conviction is shared by the theorists like David Held (2005: 137), Jürgen Habermas (2007: 136), 
Danele Archibugi (2009) and Thomas Pogge (1992b: 58) that this thesis concentrates on in chapter four. 
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After discussing the central conceptual issues relating to the critique of Westphalian 
sovereignty in the cosmopolitan tradition and their approach to sovereignty, the next 
section now moves on to analyze the specific foundation of cosmopolitans’ conception 
of sovereignty. 
2.3. Cosmopolitan Sovereignty as Popular Sovereignty 
In the previous section the cosmopolitans’ critique of Westphalian sovereignty was 
mapped out in detail and the cosmopolitan conception of sovereignty was explored. The 
following section will turn the analytical focus to what is underlying the concept of 
“cosmopolitan sovereignty”. In the following, I will argue that the cosmopolitan 
argument for dispersion of sovereignty and reconstruction of the global world order is 
grounded on a special conception of sovereignty, which is popular sovereignty. 
Popular sovereignty is distinct from state’s sovereignty – the latter reflects 
Westphalian notion of sovereignty as territorial authority exercised by the sovereign; 
whereas the former has been historically associated to the sovereign powers of the 
people. Popular sovereignty entails representative institutions, the separation of powers, 
and the right for self-governance
13
. Benhabib (2001: 28) has formulated these objectives 
at the core of popular sovereignty as follows: 
(…) Popular sovereignty aims at widening the circle of representation 
among all members of the demos in an enduring form; popular sovereignty 
aims at the control of state power via the separation of powers between the 
judiciary, the legislative, and the executive; popular sovereignty means 
creating structures of accountability and transparency in the public exercise 
of power. 
Historically, popular sovereignty has had contingent connections to the nation state. 
The political authority of the sovereign is derived from the people and the sovereign 
powers of the demos constrain the nation state’s sovereignty. Benhabib (2001: 34) has 
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 The traditional understanding of popular sovereignty since Locke understood the rights of the peoples 
formulated to check the powers of government. However cosmopolitans have a novel interpretation of 
popular sovereignty, which has been endorsed by cosmopolitan theorists since Habermas. In a similar 
vein to the previous tradition, Habermas understands governmental authority as originated from the 
powers of the people, however for him the concept of popular sovereignty represents the participatory 
procedures of democratic practice and the rights serve to secure its conditions of possibility. This means, 
that for him popular sovereignty is synonymous with the procedures of democratic opinion- and will-
formation. Thus according to Habermas, rights do not limit the exercise of popular sovereignty, but 
provide the conditions for its possibility: “rights do not restrain the political power of popular sovereignty 
but rather enable it.” (Lupel 2009: 77 – 78) Thus cosmopolitans apply a specific understanding of popular 
sovereignty which is defined in terms of rights to participation. 
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described these tensions between state’s territorial sovereignty and popular sovereignty 
in terms of democracy: “democracy is the process through which the popular sovereign 
tries to tame state sovereignty by making it responsive, transparent, and accountable to 
the people”. Popular sovereignty entails that the demos have the possibility to govern 
themselves within a democratic institutional framework. 
Cosmopolitan political theorists (Archibugi and Held 1995; Benhabib 2001: 34) have 
argued that popular sovereignty should no longer be connected to the physical presence 
of a people gathered in the delimited territory of the state, but instead popular 
sovereignty should refer to the interlocked global public sphere based on democratic 
principles. This would mean that from the perspective of cosmopolitan theory popular 
sovereignty would shift from national level to the supra- and transnational level and 
“the whole mankind would be constituted as a single demos” (Marchetti 2012: 25). The 
cosmopolitan conception of global order, which envisions (horizontally and vertically) 
divided sovereignty at various political levels, implies the idea that citizenship does not 
mean exclusively a membership of a national community, but instead a global 
citizenship where “(…) all persons have equal rights and duties in the cross-cutting 
spheres of decision-making which can affect their vital needs and interests” (Held 2012: 
101). Thus cosmopolitans argue that the concept of citizenship must be rearticulated and 
re-entrenched to extend the peoples’ political membership to cover these diverse 
political communities (the local, regional, and global) (Held 2012: 101, Pogge 2005: 
178). This argument is based on the issues discussed in sections 2.1. and 2.2. 
This cosmopolitan model of top-down structure of the global demos is presented in 
Figure 2. The cosmopolitan model of global governance involves the national and 
transnational demoi, supplemented by the intergovernmental representation, and united 
under the all-inclusive global demos. 
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Figure 1 The Ideal System of Global Democracy (Marchetti 2012: 25) 
Because of the process of globalization, the local, national, regional and global issues 
are becoming increasingly interwoven, however from one hand, the nation state has 
proven incapable of solving the issues on its own; on the other hand the institutions of 
global governance established for addressing these issues are too distant from the 
people, and suffer from a democracy deficit. Held has expressed his critique of current 
global order by saying that nowadays the regional and global forces “enable power and 
resources to flow across, over and around territorial boundaries, escaping mechanisms 
of democratic control” (2010: 242). However, as it is the people – irrespective of their 
nationality –, who are affected by the decisions taken at the global level, the demos 
should be constituted at the global level and vested with sovereign powers to have 
control over these global processes
14. Thus the “(…) accountability chains and 
democratic processes” (Held 2012: 243) should be extended to the global sphere so that 
the people who are significantly affected by them would have sovereign powers. This 
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 Benhabib (2008: 28 – 29) has supported this by arguing that, “the future of global citizenship lies in 
becoming actively involved in such transnational organizations and working towards global governance”. 
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forms the foundation of the cosmopolitans’ project of moving beyond national 
citizenship towards a postnational “cosmopolitan” citizenship.  
To constitute human beings as cosmopolitan (world) citizens entails a claim for the 
protection of the people’s fundamental human rights and political rights at the global 
level. Thus the protection of human rights is at the heart of the cosmopolitan project, 
because “without guaranteeing the fundamental human rights, the cosmopolitan ideal 
that these citizens could participate in the management of the world’s affairs becomes 
void” (Archibugi 2009: 187): in the cosmopolitan world order the demos should have 
the possibilities for popular participation in the global affairs. From this perspective the 
fulfillment of human rights creates conditions for the demos to participate in the 
governance of global affairs, hence make the exercise of popular sovereignty possible in 
the first place. 
In order to realize popular sovereignty at the global level, cosmopolitans consider the 
establishment of supranational democracy
15
 necessary to ground the current and future 
international institutions on the democratic principles of accountability and 
transparency. They argue that in the ideal structure of a future cosmopolitan order, all 
individuals should be conceived as citizens of the world on whom the new cosmopolitan 
institutions would be founded (Archibugi 2010: 325). In this way, the order would be 
based on the protection of the rights and the democratic participation of “cosmopolitan” 
citizens. Therefore, central to the world order envisioned by cosmopolitans’ are the 
principles of democracy and the rights of the cosmopolitan citizens. 
In the context of this chapter the cosmopolitans appeal for “superseding state’s 
sovereignty” (Archibugi 2013: 319) obtains the meaning of replacing the traditional 
state’s territorial sovereignty with popular sovereignty at the global level. The 
redefinition of classical sovereignty in terms of popular sovereignty is necessary to 
create more legitimate forms of governance at the global level. Sovereignty at the global 
level should be based on legitimate rule, where institutions are accountable to the 
demos. Introducing the concept of cosmopolitan citizenship at the core of the theory 
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 Proponents of transnational democracy argue that democracy at the transnational level does not mean 
the set of all democratic states, which would imply founding the global democracy on democracy within 
states; instead it means adding a (transnational) level of political representation to the already existing 
ones – which will lead to democracy among states and eventually a global democracy –, where citizens 
would have the chance to participate in the management of global affairs. (Archibugi 2002: 31) 
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allows cosmopolitans to enable the demos to govern itself at the global level and 
enhances the representative capacity of the cosmopolitan institutions, thus creating a 
strong foundation for the legitimacy of cosmopolitan supranational institutional order. 
However some caution is necessary before accepting this approach taken by 
cosmopolitans, as it has been subject to a lot of criticism
16
. In the context of this thesis 
the conflict between the doctrine of popular sovereignty, which underpins the 
cosmopolitans’ conception of sovereignty, and the humanitarian intervention that the 
cosmopolitans simultaneously promote is the main problem. Cosmopolitans use popular 
sovereignty to legitimize the establishment of democracy at the global level. However 
the right for the self-governance and self-determination of the people in the domestic 
realm contradicts with foreign intervention into the domestic affairs of the state even if 
it is for the good of those peoples (Habermas 2013: 70). Thus it seems that by endorsing 
the principles of popular sovereignty, cosmopolitans contradict themselves by 
promoting humanitarian intervention. Therefore, it is important to question whether the 
reconceptualization of popular sovereignty at the global level would help to overcome 
this fundamental contradiction. 
2.4. Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the three key aspects of the cosmopolitan conception of 
sovereignty: 1) the critical stance towards the Westphalian sovereignty concept; 2) the 
argument for re-conceptualization of the traditional understanding of sovereignty; and 
3) the concept of cosmopolitan sovereignty defined in terms of popular sovereignty. 
Opposed to the other paradigms in the field of IR, that consider the state as the final 
source of authority, and hold unquestioned the idea of an international system composed 
of sovereign states, the cosmopolitan paradigm argues that a system of sovereign states 
is “historically specific and normatively undesirable” (Fine 2003: 453). Thus according 
to cosmopolitans, the sovereign states system is a product of history and not a 
permanent feature of the human condition. The re-conceptualization of sovereignty as 
popular sovereignty would imply transformations in both the understanding of 
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 Some theorists have criticized the proponents of cosmopolitanism as too abstract and idealistic 
“[cosmopolitanism] seems to presuppose a form of popular sovereignty, a global demos, which is 
nowhere in existence” (Benhabib 2001: 30). 
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sovereignty and the structure of the global governance system. Thus by establishing the 
cosmopolitan sovereignty on the principles of popular sovereignty, allows 
cosmopolitans to reconstruct a more legitimate world order.  
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3. COSMOPOLITANISM: IDEAL THEORY FRAMEWORK 
This chapter will present and analyze the institutional models of modern 
cosmopolitan thinkers like Archibugi (2009), Habermas (2007, 2013), Held (2005, 
2013) and Pogge (1992a, 1992b) and will ask how they address the issue of governance 
in a cosmopolitan world order and which kind of institutional solutions they offer. 
These views will be analyzed and compared, overlapping areas of consensus will be 
identified and disagreements highlighted. As the focus of this thesis is to clarify the 
question of legitimate agent for a humanitarian intervention according to the 
cosmopolitan conception, importance will be given to who, according to those theorists, 
should have the right for legitimate use of force. The aim is to find alternative 
authorization and implementation institution(s) in the framework of cosmopolitanism to 
increase the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions. Archibugi, Habermas, Held and 
Pogge all seek to offer best possible feasible alternatives to the current global order that 
could be reachable from “where we are now” (Pogge 1992b: 69). Thus this chapter will 
explore the alternative cosmopolitan institutional frameworks and elaborate on how 
humanitarian intervention would take place in this framework. 
As was discussed in chapter 2, cosmopolitans argue that the concept of sovereignty 
will need to be re-conceptualized and detached from the notion of the nation-state. At 
the root of the extension of sovereignty to the trans- and supranational level lies the 
problem of legitimation. However, as was shown in chapter 2 section 2.3., 
cosmopolitans seek to legitimize global governance through the concept of popular 
sovereignty, by constituting the demos at the global level. As cosmopolitans are critical 
about the capability of states to protect human rights, they argue that human rights 
protection should be institutionalized at the global level. Nonetheless it is important to 
question why the protection of human rights should be organized better at other levels 
than the state. Thus section 3.1 will introduce the institutional proposals under 
consideration and section 3.2 will analyze critically the models presented. 
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3.1. Contesting Conceptions of Governance: an Analysis of Cosmopolitan 
Institutional Models 
This chapter will map out and analyze the positions that cosmopolitans like Archibugi, 
Habermas, Held and Pogge have taken on the issue of sovereignty in a cosmopolitan 
world order and will present and analyze the institutional models they have offered. 
Before approaching those political theorists, it is important to emphasize that a coherent 
view among cosmopolitans about how political power should be institutionalized on a 
global level does not exist: hence cosmopolitans have disagreements about how the 
architecture of international system should be constructed. 
Archibugi and Held as proponents of cosmopolitan democracy argue for taking the 
democratic process beyond the nation state, which would realize in a sort of a 
cosmopolis – a democratic constitutional world order (Archibugi 2002; Held 2012). 
Pogge’s (1992b) vertical distribution of sovereignty differs from cosmopolitan 
democracy model with lesser degree of centralization of powers at the global level. 
Habermas (2007) argues for achieving a “cosmopolitan condition” in the international-
level, which would require less centralization of powers at the global level than 
cosmopolitan democracy proponents, however it delegates more powers at the global 
and regional levels than Pogge. Thus these cosmopolitans can be divided by the degree 
of centralization and reforms required: moderate models of cosmopolitanism (Habermas 
and Pogge), contrasted to the defenders of a more radical institutional model of 
cosmopolitan democracy, which demands more fundamental changes in the global order 
(Archibugi and Held). 
By establishing the cosmopolitan international order cosmopolitanism seeks to 
overcome the state of nature between the states – the international anarchy –, however 
according to these theorists this would not mean a central overarching authority, but a 
system of governance without global government
17
. 
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 In contrast, some IR theorists like Morgenthau (1985) and Wendt (2003) have argued that international 
anarchy can only be transcended with the development of a world state. 
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3.1.1. Pogge: Dispersion of Sovereignty 
Pogge has contested the idea of a sovereign territorial state as the basic mode of 
political organization. Thus he proposes a vertical dispersion of sovereignty, which 
implies a decentralization away from current level of state power and a centralization 
on different political units of various sizes (neighborhood, town, county, province, state, 
region and world at large), without any political unit being dominant (Pogge 1992b: 58). 
Therefore Pogge argues for a vertical division of sovereignty, which he characterizes in 
the following way: 
Persons should be citizens of, and govern themselves through, a number 
of political units of various sizes, without any one political unit being 
dominant and thus occupying the traditional role of state (ibid.: 58). 
This means that he argues for (1) reallocation of political authority by dividing it 
between multiple levels of governing, as well as (2) abandonment of the prevalence of 
the state in the international order, by which the state ceases to be the primary political 
unit. In this multilayered scheme citizenship would be tied to the various levels in which 
the person identifies himself. The purpose of this dispersion of sovereign powers is to 
create a system of checks and balances, without any governmental body that would have 
the powers as the national governments currently enjoy (Pogge 1992a: 97). Thus Pogge 
distances himself from the world government model as “the ultimate concentration of 
sovereign powers” (ibid.).  
An important aspect of Pogge’s cosmopolitanism is that he describes his approach to 
the of global order as an institutional cosmopolitanism, which is centered around human 
rights (1992a: 50), where the responsibility for the fulfillment of human rights is placed 
on the institutions. He considers reforms in the global order as necessary to reach a just 
international institutional scheme that facilitates the fulfillment and protection of human 
rights at the institutional level(s) (1992a: 95). 
3.1.2. Habermas: Postnational Democracy 
Habermas proposes a more delimited dispersion of sovereignty between three arenas 
and three kinds of collective actors (Habermas 2013: 271): this is the supranational, 
transnational and state level. At the supranational level, Habermas considers the 
reformed UN as the world organization which has as the two main functions of securing 
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peace and promoting human rights on a global scale. Therefore, the classical functions 
of the nation-state like security, law and order, and the protection of individuals’ rights, 
would be transferred to a supranational world organization. The world organization 
would have control over those limited policy fields “(…) without itself taking on the 
character of a state” (Habermas 2013: 271). He suggests that the reformed UN would 
remain composed of states in the first instance and not of world citizens (ibid. 272). 
Thus according to Habermas, states retain a privileged status: “(…) the states remain the 
most important actors and the final arbiters at the global political stage” (Habermas 
2007: 176). This idea differs from Pogge, who does not refer that the state would have a 
role in the global level political institutions. 
At the transnational level he conceives the international relations between states, in a 
similar manner as they have functioned until nowadays, however in a modified form as 
“continental regimes”. Habermas argues that in order to guarantee equality of political 
weight and effective political power between all actors, smaller nation-states would 
need to unite in continental or regional regimes
18
. Here the states would address the 
problems (e.g. global economic, ecological issues, health etc.) of global “domestic” 
politics within a framework of permanent conferences and negotiating forums 
(Habermas 2007: 109). This would create a system of checks and balances to constrain 
the powers of large states and to enhance those of the smaller states. At the third level, 
are the nation-states, which remain a source of authority and legitimacy. (ibid. 136) In 
similar vain to Pogge, Habermas also rejects the idea of a world state by stating: “the 
democratic federal state writ large – the global state of nations of world republic is the 
wrong model” (ibid. 134). Instead he proposes a decentered world society as a 
multilevel system that lacks state-like characteristics (ibid. 135 – 136). 
The world society without world government becomes possible through the 
constitutionalization of international relations, where international law would transform 
into cosmopolitan law (ibid.: 135). Under this cosmopolitan legal order, the powers of 
the nation-state would be limited in scope of action, however they would retain their 
status as subjects of the global legal order, and the citizens would also acquire the status 
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 Here Habermas follows mostly the EU model, however he mentions also other regional forms of 
intergovernmental cooperation like APEC, ASEAN, NAFTA, AU, ECOWAS, OAS, etc. as an evidence 
that in order to handle the loss of sovereignty, states will need to form alliances (Habermas 2010: 273). 
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of subject of cosmopolitan law (2013: 269): they would be not just citizens of the 
nation-state, but also cosmopolitan world citizens. In this manner, as the world citizens, 
they could assert legal claims against their own governments if necessary (Habermas 
2007: 109). Thus as the cosmopolitan condition Habermas envisions is a type of 
cosmopolitan legal regime, where human rights protection would be facilitated by 
granting individual human beings status as a world citizen, at par with the status of the 
state. In case the government violates the human rights of its citizens, “a global police 
force (…) would act on behalf of the basic rights of cosmopolitan citizens” (Habermas 
2013: 279). As the monopoly of force would remain with the state (ibid. 280) this global 
police force would be assembled of the nation-state forces under the UN authorization. 
3.1.3. Archibugi and Held: Cosmopolitan democracy 
Even though the main theorists of cosmopolitan democracy, Archibugi and Held, 
have diverging opinions about some aspects of the institutionalization of the 
cosmopolitan democracy model, which will be indicated below, their reform program 
overlaps to a large extent. Thus the theory of cosmopolitan democracy will be presented 
here as a coherent theory. 
The proponents of cosmopolitan democracy propose multilayered governance where 
sovereignty would be divided between local, state, interstate, regional, and global 
dimensions (Archibugi 2013: 314)
19
. Archibugi suggests (ibid.), that the relationship 
between the dimensions would not be hierarchical, but functional: each level would be 
autonomous, but a necessary complement the other levels. This implies, that the 
democracy would take the classical form of division of powers and competences, as 
within states, however in “(…) different levels of political interaction and 
interconnectedness – levels which corresponding to the degrees to which public issues 
stretch across and affect populations” (Held 2005.: 236). They consider this dispersion 
of sovereignty by domain of authority both horizontally and vertically necessary to 
handle the common problems at the appropriate level of decision making (ibid. 235 – 
237), meaning that local problems should be dealt with at the local or national level, and 
global problems should be handled in the transnational or supranational level.  
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 Held (2013: 272 – 273) supports in a similar vain to Habermas the creation of regional parliaments who 
would have an independent voice in world politics (ibid. 283), whereas Archibugi has not made such 
proposals. 
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Here Archibugi and Held differ over whether the concept of sovereignty as an 
ordering principle needs to be modified (Held) or discarded altogether (Archibugi) 
(Brown, Held 2013: 12). Held argues that this dispersion of sovereignty becomes 
possible through the detachment of sovereignty from fixed borders and understanding it 
as an attribute of cosmopolitan democratic law:  
Cosmopolitan sovereignty is sovereignty stripped away from the idea of 
fixed borders and territories governed by states alone, and is instead thought 
of as frameworks of political regulatory relations and activities, shaped and 
formed by an overarching cosmopolitan legal framework (2002: 33). 
Archibugi (2004b: 452) has a similar transformation of sovereignty in mind, however 
he argues that sovereignty should be substituted with (global) constitutionalism. He 
argues that: “conflicts concerning the issue of competence arising as a result of the 
different levels of governance, must be solved within the domain of global 
constitutionalism, and referred to jurisdictional bodies (…)” (ibid.) Thus by creating a 
legal system that would constrain the international system, they try to distance 
themselves from the notion of sovereignty at the global level, which would entail a 
world state. 
Disagreements also arise about the contents and scope of citizenship. Held argues 
that as sovereignty would be divided between various levels of governance, creating an 
“overlapping cosmopolitan polity”, the people would also enjoy multiple citizenships: 
In a world of overlapping communities of fate, individuals would be 
citizens of their immediate political communities and of the wider regional 
and global networks which impacted upon their lives (Held 2013: 240). 
Archibugi on the other side suggests that together with the citizenship of the nation-
state, individuals would just acquire a cosmopolitan citizenship (ibid. 321): hence 
Archibugi does not necessarily imply that citizenship would be dispersed between all 
political levels. 
The theorists of cosmopolitan democracy argue that if global issues are to be handled 
according to democratic principles at the global level, “(…) there must be political 
representation for citizens in global affairs, independently and autonomously of their 
political representation in domestic affairs” (Archibugi et al. 1998: 211 – 212). Thus 
they propose the formation of an authoritative World Parliamentary Assembly of all 
democratic states and agencies – a reformed UN General Assembly or a complement to 
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it as a “second chamber” –, where the world citizens would be represented not by their 
governments, but by directly elected representatives (Held 2005: 273 - 274). Thus both 
individuals and states would have their own representatives at the global level. They 
envision this as “(…) an effective institutional framework to represent the people and 
movements of the world, many of whom require protection from their states and 
governments” (ibid. 273). This independent assembly of democratic peoples, is a 
necessary institutional requirement for the project of cosmopolitan democracy as they 
want to increase the political participation of the citizens in the governance of the global 
questions and enable better protection of human rights. Habermas (2013: 272) at this 
point departs from the theorists of cosmopolitan democracy as according to his account 
the world organization should not be comprised of global citizens but of states and 
should keep the current form as an organization. 
What is different between Archibugi and Held is the role of coercive powers. Held 
argues for the establishment of an effective, accountable, regional and global police 
force for the last-resort use of coercive power in defense of international humanitarian 
or cosmopolitan law (Held: 2013: 306). On one hand, the coercive powers in the global 
level are necessary for humanitarian purposes, however on the other hand, according to 
Held, the new institutional model would need to be backed-up by coercive powers: 
“(…) it is dangerously over optimistic to conceive the cosmopolitan model without 
coercive powers, because tyrannical attacks against democratic law cannot be ruled out” 
(Held 2005: 276). Thus according to his conception, the world organization would have 
military forces under its command and would exercise police functions
20
. Therefore he 
suggests that there would be a permanent shift of nation-state’s coercive capabilities to 
the regional and global institutions (ibid. 279). Archibugi (2013: 322) sees the necessity 
of coercive powers at the global level only for humanitarian purposes. The states would 
retain their armed forces, however there would also exist permanent “rescue army”, 
deployable on the request of UN Secretary General (ibid.). The proponents of 
cosmopolitan democracy model are with Habermas and Pogge in arguing, that “(…) it 
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 Held is somewhat unclear when discussing who should have the monopoly of coercive power at 
regional and global levels and he offers two possible solutions, where the latter he considers preferable: 1) 
a proportion of nation-state’s military could be seconded to the new international authorities and placed at 
their disposal on a routine basis; 2) these authorities could create a permanent independent force recruited 
directly from among individuals who volunteer from all countries (Held 2005: 276). 
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is preferable not to proceed beyond a certain degree of centralization of power, and in 
particular, of means of coercion on such a large scale as that of the entire planet” 
(Archibugi 2013: 325). Thus, in principle, all cosmopolitans presented here, reject the 
idea of a centralized world state. 
To get a better overview of the institutional models proposals outlined above, and to 
bring out the contradictory and overlapping areas of consensus, it seems helpful to 
visualize the institutional models in a table (see Table 2). 
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Table 2 Cosmopolitan Institutional Models (Source: the author) 
Models of 
institutional 
cosmopolitanism 
Main 
defender(s) 
Model of Sovereignty  Levels of Global 
Governance 
Levels of Citizenship Legitimate Use of Force 
Cosmopolitan 
democracy 
Daniele  
Archibugi 
  
Sovereignty replaced by 
global constitutionalism 
Local, state, interstate, 
regional, and global level 
(world organization with an 
assembly of democratic 
peoples) 
National citizenship and 
cosmopolitan citizenship 
States would retain their armed 
forces, however there would exist 
also a permanent “rescue force” at 
the global level for humanitarian 
purposes, deployable on the request 
of UN Secretary General. 
David Held Sovereignty replaced by 
cosmopolitan 
democratic law 
Local, state, interstate, 
regional (regional 
parliaments), and global level 
(world organization with an 
assembly of democratic 
peoples) 
Multiple citizenships at 
various levels (including 
cosmopolitan citizenship) 
A permanent shift of nation-state’s 
coercive capabilities to the regional 
and global institutions. The creation 
of a permanent force at the global 
level for enforcement of 
humanitarian law and cosmopolitan 
law.  
Postnational 
democracy 
Jürgen 
Habermas 
Constitutionalization of 
international law 
Supranational, transnational, 
(regional or continental 
regimes) and nation-state 
level (remains the source of 
authority and legitimacy) 
 
Citizenship rests in the 
nation state; but 
individuals would also 
obtain the world 
citizenship as subjects of 
international law. 
Monopoly of force remains with the 
state. Global police force under the 
world organization assembled of 
nation-state forces. 
Dispersed 
sovereignty 
Thomas 
Pogge 
Vertical dispersion of 
sovereignty 
Neighborhood, town, county, 
province, state, region and 
global level 
Multilayered citizenship -
21
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 There is no clear indication in Pogge’s texts about the coercive forces. 
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3.2. A Critical Analysis 
The cosmopolitan institutional models represent ideals of the global order to which 
the current world should approximate. However, it is necessary to critically evaluate 
whether those ideals really are something to aspire to by asking what these concepts 
imply in reality. The cosmopolitans presented above are critical about the capability of 
states to protect human rights and thus the question of whether the world should be 
organized around the sovereign states system if rights are not protected by them arises 
(Lang 2010: 331). However it is important to question why human rights fulfillment and 
protection would realize better when the decision-making powers are moved to higher 
levels and units. 
Pogge’s vertical dispersion of sovereignty seems a desirable aim at first sight, as it 
would limit states’ inviolable sovereignty that too many times has led to the 
disregarding of human rights violations by the international community; however it is 
important to question whether and how the human rights protection would realize better 
in a system of dispersed sovereignty. Pogge (2013: 123) argues, that: 
(...) Massive violations of human rights could be reduced through a 
vertical dispersal of sovereignty over various layers of political units that 
would check and balance one another as well as publicize one another’s 
abuses. 
His institutional model requires complete division of sovereignty between the 
various political levels, which implies that no level would have powers than any other. 
This raises the question of how can the humanitarian law be effectively enforced if there 
are no “higher” political institutions with powers to coerce the violators of individuals’ 
fundamental rights. It seems that according to Pogge it is not necessary for some levels 
to have more powers of coercion, implying that he has an idealized understanding of the 
localized levels. Thus the most serious drawback of Pogge’s approach is that the 
“higher” political levels do not have any stronger powers of coercion to force the 
political units to compliance and to stop large-scale human rights violations at lower 
levels. 
The project of cosmopolitan democracy at first sight seems to provide much better 
protection of human rights at the international level than Pogge’s vertical distribution of 
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sovereignty. By attributing the individuals with cosmopolitan citizenship next to the 
national citizenship, individuals can legitimately appeal to international organizations 
for the protection of their rights by the international police force. However the 
disadvantages of this approach are the political implications: the consequences of (1) the 
constitutionalization of international law, (2) the creation of world parliament, and (3) 
world police force. On one hand, it is possible to doubt whether these institutions would 
be more effective than the current existing institutions at the global level; whereas on 
the other hand, the real democratic nature of these institutions is questionable. 
If democracy is to be understood as “a system of popular control over governmental 
policies and decisions” (Dahl 2013: 424), then it is possible to criticize the 
cosmopolitan democracy on two grounds. The first major weakness of the cosmopolitan 
democracy project is actual political power of the world parliament
22
. Archibugi and 
Held (2011: 9) admit, that “it is unlikely that such an organ [the world parliament] 
would have effective powers (…), but even if it were simply a forum reflecting and 
deliberating upon global public opinion it could play an important role in identifying 
and confronting policies on world issues”. However in this form, the world parliament, 
which is supposed to represent the global demos and enable them participation in the 
management of global affairs, would lack both efficiency and legitimacy and thus 
would not be meaningfully democratic. Thus a question that needs to be asked is what 
use is a people’s parliament that does not have any substantial powers, and where states 
continue to make all the important decisions. This reveals the limits of this theoretical 
approach, as the global democracy and popular control at the global level turn out to be 
intrinsically void. The second drawback of cosmopolitan democracy has been pointed 
out by Habermas (2013: 272), who has criticized the project of cosmopolitan democracy 
arguing “ (…) that there cannot be a world parliament, without a world republic”. This 
criticism goes at the heart of the cosmopolitan democracy as it claims to bring about an 
order of global governance without global government. By institutionalizing these 
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 When envisioning the World Parliamentary Assembly cosmopolitan democrats build on the European 
Parliament model (Archibugi, Held 2011: 9). However, as the European Parliament model has shown, 
collective action problems accompany the extension of democracy at the supranational level. The 
individual states’ interests conflict with what would be in the collective interest of the European Union, 
which inhibits the outcomes of the Parliament. Paradoxically, to ensure that decisions would be taken 
according to the collective interest of European peoples, it would mean that more powers should be 
delegated to the EU level. 
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bodies – the legislative, administrative and coercive – at the global level it remains 
unclear how the cosmopolitan democracy would be different from a world state order. 
Dahl (2013) and Kymlicka (2013: 439) have maintained that it is implausible that the 
international institutions and organizations would be democratic in any meaningful 
sense and that it would be dangerous to delegate powers to effectively non-democratic 
structures. This criticism is based on the argument that by transferring democratic 
governance to the supranational level the capacity of the people to participate 
effectively in governing would be diminished (Dahl 2013: 425). Paradoxically, as the 
global institutions gain more powers, the capacity of the people to influence the 
decisions reduces. Thus it is questionable whether a type of global governance, short of 
a world state, would turn out to be less oppressive then a global government. 
Habermas’s proposal for a postnational democracy envisions much more limited 
powers at the global level, entrusting only the functions of securing peace and the 
protection of human rights to the world organization. These tasks should be governed at 
the global level to ensure that wars would be limited and human rights abuses would be 
dealt with in all corners of the world in an impartial manner. The establishment of 
permanent police force under the world organization’s command would ensure that the 
protection of human rights would not depend merely on the political will of states and 
their ad hoc contribution of troops. It is quite plausible that the strengthened 
international enforcement of human rights would be more effective than the current 
system, where primary responsibility of protection is entrusted to the nation states and 
international community intervenes only in extreme emergences, if even then. Fabre 
(2012: 188) has supported this position: 
By parity of reasoning, victims of rights violations at the hands of their 
own regime are (usually) better off entrusting multinational institutions with 
the task of authorizing the quick deployment of an international army, since 
those institutions are more likely to be impartial and to reach their decision 
to use force in a transparent and accountable way than lone, unmandated 
interveners. 
However it is equally important that according to Habermas the ultimate monopoly 
of coercive powers would rest in nation-states (Habermas 2013: 280). Habermas 
recognizes the state as a persistent part of the international system which has a special 
role in the fulfillment of human rights. However it is necessary to question whether in 
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this form – when the state remains the holder of coercive powers – the international 
human rights protection regime would not remain as weak as it is currently. By limiting 
the powers and functions of the world organization and dividing the competences 
between the national and regional levels, Habermas avoids the development of a 
despotic world state. However this comes at the expense of a more effective protection 
of human rights.  
This chapter took a critical perspective on whether the cosmopolitan project is a 
desirable project as an end-state for the realization of human rights protection. 
Cosmopolitans believe, that human rights fulfillment and protection should organize 
better at the global level, however as was argued above, it is questionable whether the 
institutional frameworks would function in the way cosmopolitans claim and if they 
would provide significantly improved human rights protection. However it might be too 
early “to throw the baby out with the bathwater”: cosmopolitan institutional models 
represent an ideal of a more just world order, towards which the current non-ideal world 
should approach. Thus the reform proposals of cosmopolitans can be perceived as 
normative guidelines for realizing a more just world order, where the conditions for 
human rights fulfillment and protection would be met. 
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4. COSMOPOLITAN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
Cosmopolitanism has a unique approach to humanitarian intervention with regards to 
the principles and means to be employed and thus gives answers that are substantially 
different from other schools of thought (Archibugi 2009: 187). The cosmopolitan 
approach towards humanitarian intervention differs from the other theories of IR as it is 
driven from moral commitment to individuals’ human rights, global justice and the idea 
of global governance. The concern for the protection of human rights globally is at the 
core of cosmopolitan justifications for a humanitarian intervention as they argue that 
there is not merely a right to intervene, but a stronger commitment in the form of a duty 
to relieve the suffering of peoples, which applies regardless of the state borders. This 
implies that for cosmopolitans, political borders of states are arbitrary from a moral 
perspective and should not influence individuals’ prospects for having their fundamental 
rights guaranteed. Therefore a cosmopolitan approach considers the duties what we owe 
to our co-nationals and citizens to be equal with the respect we owe to all individuals 
globally and thus would argue for “saving strangers” (Wheeler 2002) by promoting a 
humanitarian intervention. 
Cosmopolitans seek to weaken the states’ sovereignty in order to enable improved 
international human rights protection and facilitate humanitarian interventions. Thus, as 
was discussed in chapter three, cosmopolitans argue that the concept of national 
sovereignty must be reconsidered to the advantage of human rights
23
 (Habermas 2010: 
270). Thereby, cosmopolitans aim to achieve a condition where no large-scale violation 
of individuals’ fundamental rights would be left disregarded only because the 
perpetrators are protected by nation state’s sovereignty or because the victims are 
foreigners (Fine 2007: 81). By detaching the individuals’ fundamental rights from their 
confinement to the state, cosmopolitanism seems to overcome the tensions between the 
concept of humanitarian intervention and the violation of state’s sovereignty. 
Central to the discussion in this chapter is the theoretical perspective which 
cosmopolitans have adopted to discuss the question of humanitarian intervention. As 
humanitarian intervention is a necessity in this non-ideal world, they have developed a 
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 Habermas (2010: 270) has maintained that nowadays internal state sovereignty is not restricted only to 
maintaining law and order, but also includes the effective protection of the rights of the citizens. 
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“non-ideal theory concerning questions of war and peace” to respond to the problems of 
the current non-ideal reality (Lang 2010: 331). Thus, while chapter three analyzed the 
ideal theory of global governance and attempted to locate the ideal agent(s) for 
humanitarian intervention in the cosmopolitan institutional models framework, this 
chapter will analyze the non-ideal theory of cosmopolitanism about humanitarian 
intervention. It is important to consider both theoretical perspectives to understand 
whether the ideal normative theories can give us feasible practical guidance for the non-
ideal reality. 
The purpose of the following chapter is to analyze the cosmopolitan (normative) 
conceptions of humanitarian intervention and focus in particular on the question of who 
is the most legitimate agent to (1) authorize and (2) undertake an intervention. The 
chapter will clarify the aspects and contents of right agency, establish a cosmopolitan 
framework for a humanitarian intervention, and will subject this framework to critical 
analysis. 
4.1. Towards a Cosmopolitan Definition of Humanitarian Intervention 
Before proceeding with the argument, a clarification of the concept being analyzed in 
this chapter and in the following chapters is in order. In the following discussion about 
humanitarian intervention’s agency, I will adopt Holzgrefe’s (2003: 18) definition of 
humanitarian intervention: 
The threat or use of force across state borders by state (or group of states) 
aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the 
fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without 
the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied. 
This understanding captures the three elements of humanitarian military intervention 
on which there exists a general consensus in the academia. Firstly, there must be a large-
scale and serious violations of fundamental human rights present. Secondly, force is 
used to intervene into the domain of a sovereign state. Thirdly, the intervention is done 
against the will of the sovereign within which territory the intervention is taking place. 
However one important limitation needs to be acknowledged: this definition considers 
as an agent for an intervention only states or group of states. To adopt a cosmopolitan 
approach would mean to recognize that also institutions other than states can be 
engaged in intervention. Thus an alteration of the definition is in order to have a wider 
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account of who can engage in intervention. Hedley Bull’s definition is helpful here, as 
he has defined intervention as “(…) dictatorial or coercive interference, by an outside 
party or parties, in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state, or more broadly of an 
independent political community” (Bull 1984: 1). As this definition can be criticized for 
“its use of the pejorative words dictatorial and interference (…), suggesting before any 
normative considerations have been adduced, that intervention is wrong” (Caney 2005: 
228), I will dismiss this definition in general, however one feature is worth adopting – 
the wide definition of an agent for intervention, “outside party or parties”. Hence the 
definition this thesis is based on will take the following formulation: 
The threat or use of force across state borders, by an outside party or 
parties, aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of 
the fundamental human rights of individuals (other than its own citizens), 
without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied. 
4.2. Humanitarian Intervention Agency: Conceptual Clarifications  
Most contemporary political theorists agree that humanitarian interventions should 
be undertaken to stop large scale violations of human rights – this is connected to the 
reformulation of sovereignty in terms of responsibility – however ambiguity remains 
about which agent should undertake it. This requirement for legitimate humanitarian 
intervention has received considerably less attention in the contemporary literature than 
other conditions of just war (Fabre 2008: 963), though recently the academic interest 
has grown
24
. There seems to be a considerable degree of consensus on the other 
criterions of just war, however the problem of who should authorize and conduct a just 
act of intervention is surrounded by considerable amount of confusion, and is subject to 
heated debates in the academia. A cosmopolitan approach to this issue might give an 
account of who should be the legitimate agents to act. 
This question of the proper agent for a humanitarian intervention is comprised of two 
elements: who in particular in the international community should authorize and who 
should undertake the humanitarian military intervention. These questions are closely 
associated to the question of who should have legitimate control over coercive means at 
the international level. This section will seek to clarify the normative foundation of this 
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See for example Cecile Fabre (2008) and James Pattison (2010). 
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right authority for humanitarian intervention, establish why it is necessary that the 
intervention would be authorized and proceed under the proper agent, and lay out the 
conditions under which a certain agent can be considered legitimate. A clear 
understanding of who should be the ideal agent of humanitarian intervention is 
necessary to give “normative guidance” in case the state fails to protect its people’s 
fundamental rights. The most appropriate way to approach this question would be 
through the prism of a normative theory which has set at its heart the protection of the 
rights of all individuals. As cosmopolitanism questions the role of states in protecting 
individuals’ rights, it gives unique answers to the problem of which agent should 
intervene. 
The distinction between the agent who authorizes and who undertakes a 
humanitarian intervention has pivotal importance in the non-ideal reality. The best way 
to understand the importance of this is through negative reasoning: if there would not be 
an impartial global institution to authorize a humanitarian intervention, then 
interventions would take place in a selective and careless manner, as the agent – a state 
or a coalition of states – would only undertake a humanitarian intervention when it has 
underlying (national) interests for conducting the intervention (e.g. resources, change of 
regime etc.). Thus Archibugi (2004a: 8) has argued that in the absence of the separation 
of deliberation from implementation, humanitarian interventions would be undertaken 
not based on the nature and gravity of the human rights violations, but only on whether 
the states have the political will to carry out the military intervention. On the one hand, 
this might result in many humanitarian catastrophes being ignored as there might not be 
any agent that is willing to intervene. On the other hand, this can result in military 
interventions other than with humanitarian ends being labeled as such, because there is 
an agent willing to carry it out. (ibid.) Hence the absence of an impartial global 
authority to authorize humanitarian intervention might lead to a situation of lawlessness, 
where all interventions (even acts of war) would be justified with humanitarian ends. 
For those purposes it is important to separate the deliberation from the implementation, 
to ensure that humanitarian interventions would be undertaken neither in a selective or 
careless manner. 
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4.2.1. The Normative Foundations 
The normative foundation can be traced back to the ICISS report “The Responsibility 
to Protect” that has brought about the re-conceptualization of the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention. According to the norm accepted by the international 
community, the responsibility to protect populations from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing crimes against humanity” falls still firstly and primarily on the state (UN 
2005: 30)
25
. In line with the discussion in the previous section, as the sovereign 
authority is assigned by the people to the state, it must offer protection to the people in 
return. This principle of sovereignty as responsibility was approved by the UN General 
Assembly in the resolution “2005 World Summit Outcome” stating that in case the state 
fails to protect its people, then the responsibility is transferred to the international 
community: 
(…) We [the international community] are prepared to take collective 
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis 
and in cooperation with relevant regional organization as appropriate, 
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail 
to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity (UN 2005: 30). 
Thus this requirement of protection of human rights in the current world order rests 
primarily on the nation state, however as the sovereignty of the state is conditional on 
its capability to defend the people’s fundamental rights, if the state fails to protect them, 
it forfeits its sovereignty. As states’ sovereignty is conditional upon the upholding of 
human rights Andreson-Gold (2001: 123) has argued that states which fail to protect the 
human rights of their population have failed to meet the requirements for non-
interference. Hence in case the state fails to fulfill this responsibility, it forfeits its 
sovereignty and the responsibility to protect the people is transferred to the international 
community
26
. Pattison (2010: 4) has correctly pointed out that it is evident that the 
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 Article 138 of the Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly „2005 World Summit Outcome“ 
states: „each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity“. (UN 2005: 30) 
26
 Currently the right to intervene to protect fundamental human rights is widely recognized, however 
according to cosmopolitanism the international community should recognize a stronger moral 
commitment and accept that it is the duty to protect the population of a state that violates their 
fundamental human rights, from its own government. These issues will be discussed in section 4.4.1. and 
4.4.2. 
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primary responsibility to protect lies on the state where human rights violations are 
taking place, however problems arise when the country fails to protect its citizens and 
other peaceful measures fail, and this responsibility is transferred to the international 
community
27
. At present, it remains unclear who exactly has this duty, in the 
international community, to act in the face of large-scale and grave violations of human 
rights. Thus also the implementation of the R2P norm remains on fragile grounds. 
4.3. Cosmopolitanism: Pacifism versus Humanitarian Intervention 
Before proceeding further, it is important to address an apparent contradiction within 
the theoretical paradigm of cosmopolitanism. Fine (2007; also Smith 2007: 75) has 
highlighted the tensions between the cosmopolitans support for a military humanitarian 
intervention and their simultaneous support for a Kantian “perpetual peace”: 
On the one hand, cosmopolitan principles of human rights and global 
governance lend support to humanitarian military intervention if it is 
necessary in order to protect the basic human rights of the most vulnerable. 
On the other hand, cosmopolitanism is historically associated with the 
critique of militarism and the ideal of world peace (Fine 2007: 82). 
The same tensions in the cosmopolitan thought have been noted by Dower (2009: 70 
– 71), who observes that some cosmopolitans may defend certain kinds of military 
intervention in order to protect fundamental human rights and at the same time argue for 
various restraints in warfare. Fabre (2012: 4) on the other side has defended this 
ambivalent approach that the cosmopolitans have adopted: 
The claim that all individuals are owed equal concern and respect, which 
flows from a deeper concern with preserving their dignity as human beings 
and minimizing their suffering, is compatible with both the thesis (…) that 
we should strive for peace and, accordingly endeavor to construct an ethics 
of peace-building, and the view that we sometimes have the right to resort to 
war precisely when our or other people’s fundamental rights are violated.  
On one hand, this discord reflects the incoherent nature of cosmopolitanism, where 
opposing and contradicting theoretical views about the most fundamental questions (as 
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 Some cosmopolitans, like Dower (2009: 180), have maintained a more critical position with regards to 
the states’ capability to protect human rights and argue there has been a shift in thinking about the 
protection and promotion of human rights as responsibility primarily of the nation state with international 
community merely supporting those efforts, to understanding the protection of human rights as a 
responsibility of the international community, as it is often states themselves who violate human rights. 
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war and peace) sharply divide the school of thought. On the other hand, this can be 
interpreted as an attempt by cosmopolitans to free them from the “theoretical 
straitjacket”, which confines their theoretical explorations to the ideal (normative) 
realm, and engage with the problems present in the non-ideal reality. 
Cosmopolitans’ argument for a humanitarian intervention stems from the basic 
principles of cosmopolitanism, as they attribute ultimate moral value to individual 
human beings and thus derive the normative commitment to promote and protect human 
rights, if needed, by military force. With regards to the humanitarian intervention, the 
protection of fundamental human rights is an imperative that necessitates an action to 
contribute to their fulfillment. Through the promotion and protection of human rights by 
means of humanitarian intervention, cosmopolitans seek to contribute to the conditions 
of human rights fulfillment and in the long term to global peace. Therefore, this duty to 
protect human rights globally is inherently connected to the pacifist commitment to 
promote the conditions of just and durable peace (Dower 2009: 187)
 28
. Controversially, 
this would imply that for cosmopolitans a military intervention with humanitarian ends 
would be used as means to achieve the ideal cosmopolitan condition of perpetual peace. 
These tensions should not be dismissed, but it is possible to argue that, for 
cosmopolitans, humanitarian intervention is necessary in the imperfect world in which 
grave violations of human rights are present, however, the long-term end of 
cosmopolitan theories is the attainment of an ideal “cosmopolitan condition” of peace 
made permanent (Habermas 2007: 121). This reflects this ideal versus non-ideal world 
dilemma that cosmopolitans face: in the non-ideal reality humanitarian intervention is a 
necessary practice from a cosmopolitan perspective, however in the ideal cosmopolitan 
world this intervention would no longer exist, at least in the present form
29
. Thus 
cosmopolitanism calls for extensive reforms of our current international institutions and 
order, to change the current practices and to deal more effectively with the question of 
large-scale fundamental human rights abuses present in the imperfect world order. This 
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 Hence cosmopolitanism is in strong contrast with the realist school of thought, which argues, that 
humanitarian intervention destabilizes the international order. 
29
 This was addressed in more detail in chapter three, which mapped out the cosmopolitan institutional 
models. 
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would enable the imperfect world to progress towards an ideal cosmopolitan world 
order, where the violations of human rights would not be present. 
4.4. The Cosmopolitan Framework for a Humanitarian Intervention 
Recently an engaging discussion has taken place in academia about cosmopolitanism 
and its implications for a humanitarian intervention. Within the debate about the proper 
agent for a humanitarian intervention, ideas have been formulated about the possibility 
of “a cosmopolitan UN force” (Pattison 2010) and “a world police intervention” 
(Habermas, 2007; Archibugi 2009). Cosmopolitanism offers ideal normative principles 
which prescribe how humanitarian interventions should be carried out, however it can 
be questioned whether these ideals can offer practicable guidance in the non-ideal 
reality. On the one hand, cosmopolitans’ approach is very original as they offer ideal 
cosmopolitan solutions for conducting a humanitarian intervention in our non-ideal 
reality; on the other hand, they have been criticized for offering utopian solutions that 
assist little with the non-ideal complexities of the current world order (Fine 2007: 86). 
To clarify this account, I will firstly address the theoretical foundations of the 
cosmopolitan thought exploring the question of why there is a need for a humanitarian 
intervention according to cosmopolitans; and secondly reconstruct the principles of a 
cosmopolitan humanitarian intervention. 
4.4.1. From Right to Duty to Intervene 
This section will map out the cosmopolitan argument for a duty to conduct 
humanitarian interventions. This is a crucial step as the problem with recognizing a right 
to an intervention and disregarding the duty to act may lead to selectivity and 
inconsistency in the practice of humanitarian intervention (Hehir 2010: 134). In this 
way the legitimate agent for a humanitarian intervention would not only have the right 
to interfere – when it has the political will or when it is in the agent’s interests – within 
the sovereignty of another state in order to protect its citizens, but it would have the 
obligation to act in the name of suffering foreigners. The argument can be divided into 
the requirements of cosmopolitan (1) morality and (2) justice. 
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Firstly, cosmopolitans commitment to human beings as the “central moral concern”, 
implies that human beings have an intrinsic worth and dignity, that should not be 
violated. Pogge (1992a: 89) has argued, that:  
On the most fundamental level of morality, all living human beings 
equally have the status of ultimate units of moral concern (…); and we have 
this status vis-à-vis every other person or group, not merely against out 
compatriots, fellow-religionists, or such like (…).  
As human dignity is universal in scope, this special status of human beings is 
guaranteed in the form of human rights (ibid.), which would enable all people to live a 
dignified life. As these rights are held by all individuals universally, this implies a duty 
for others to protect those rights when they are violated. As human rights violations on a 
large scale endanger the fundamental dignity of human beings, other people have the 
obligation to ensure them the dignified human life by protecting their rights. 
Secondly, justice-based arguments for a duty of humanitarian intervention have been 
formulated extensively by Fabre (2012) and Moellendorf (2002: 36 – 67), who claim 
that justice requires that all individuals are treated with equal concern and respect, 
which in turn implies that all individuals should also have equal opportunities for a 
minimally decent life. Those conditions for a minimally decent life are guaranteed to 
individuals through rights. Fabre (2012: 34) has outlined this argument in the following 
manner:  
(…) If some freedoms and resources are needed to live a life worthy of a 
human being that provides a justification for securing those goods and 
freedoms to any given human being as a matter of right, then that fact also 
provides justification for securing them to all other human beings (…). 
This implies that fundamental rights are conferred to all individuals universally and 
establishes that these rights should be protected from serious violations. 
To understand the argument that an individual should not lack conditions for a 
“minimally decent life” (ibid.) it is necessary to introduce one important consideration. 
All human beings should have their fundamental rights guaranteed regardless of the 
place one happened to be born because a person is not responsible for being born in a 
country where those conditions are not guaranteed, or more appropriately in this 
dissertation’s context, in a country where fundamental human rights are not secured and 
large-scale violations are taking place. Thus cosmopolitans argue that there exist duties 
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of justice to protect those fundamental rights and these duties do not “depend on one’s 
geographical location on the planet” (ibid. 36; Moellendorf 2002: 125). Moellendorf 
(ibid.: 123) has formulated this idea in the following way: 
If citizens of other states have a claim to justice to be protected against 
injustices, when the state has failed to provide the protection or is 
constituting the threat, then there is a corresponding duty of non-compatriots 
to help remedy the injustice
30
. 
Thus humanitarian intervention should be conceived a duty towards foreigners, to 
guarantee the suffering peoples minimal conditions for a decent life by ensuring their 
fundamental rights. 
4.4.2. A Conditional Approach to Institutions 
 The previous section established that in case a state fails to protect the basic rights of 
the people, there exists a duty to prevent human suffering regardless of the state borders. 
As people have established institutions for the protection of their rights, this duty to 
protect is allocated to those institutions. This argument reflects an important side of the 
cosmopolitan conception of political institutions: political institutions – the state, trans- 
or supranational institutions – have value only if they protect human rights. This 
approach to institutions implies that if the political institutions fail to respect and protect 
fundamental human rights, they violate the very purpose of their existence and thus lose 
their right to govern. Pogge (1992a: 91) has expressed this in the following way: “(…) 
human rights impose constraints upon shared practices, and direct responsibility for 
their fulfillment thus rests with institutional schemes”. Thus, according to 
cosmopolitans, the political institutions are conceived as instruments for the realization 
of the promotion and protection of fundamental human rights, which makes the 
legitimacy of those institutions conditional on the fulfillment of human rights. 
As discussed in chapter two, section 2.3. cosmopolitans share the contractarian 
understanding of sovereignty and argue that the sovereign powers of states are derived 
from the people. Therefore the state has the primary responsibility for guaranteeing 
peoples’ fundamental rights within national borders. However the people have 
established a world organization who is authorized to act on their behalf as a stand-in in 
                                                 
30 This argument implies that the duties toward one’s co-nationals should not be stronger than those to 
people in other countries of the world. 
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cases of emergency when the primary agent, their government, is no longer able or 
willing to protect their rights (Habermas 2010: 280). Thus in case a state violates the 
fundamental human rights of its own citizens, the duty to protect is transferred to the 
UN. 
As argued in chapter two, the principle of popular sovereignty contradicts the 
concept of a foreign intervention even if it is for the good of the people whose 
fundamental rights are being violated
31
. However this dilemma seems to be resolved if 
one takes into consideration that through the creation of the UN, the people have 
authorized an institution to act in case their fundamental human rights are violated. As is 
stated in the preamble of the UN Charter (1945), “we the peoples of the United Nations 
(…) have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims [of the Charter]” 
and “our respective Governments (...) hereby establish an international organization to 
be known as the United Nations”. As the UN was established by the peoples, it is a 
legitimate representative body of the people and the UNSC has the right to authorize a 
humanitarian military intervention, even without the direct consent
32
 of the suffering 
people, in order to save them from a democide
33
 by their own governments. Thus 
cosmopolitans seem to overcome the tensions between the concept of popular 
sovereignty and humanitarian intervention: by establishing an international organization 
to uphold their rights, the peoples have authorized the institution to act in case of a 
humanitarian disaster
34
. 
However, this must be approached with caution because the UN, which is supposed 
to represent the people, has been composed of (and created by) the nation-states from 
the very beginning. This represents an inherent contradiction as the UN presents itself as 
an instrument of the peoples to constrain the states; however in reality it is an 
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 As popular sovereignty implies that the people have the right to self-determination and self-governance, 
in case of a humanitarian crisis, for example the people can have the right for self-defense against their 
sovereign, prior to any foreign intervention. 
32
 As the peoples have established the UN for the protection of their rights, it is possible to assume that 
they have given a tacit consent to intervene to protect their human rights if necessary, and thus a direct 
consent by the suffering people is not necessary.  
33
 The term “democide” is a relatively new concept which was introduced by Rudolph Rummel (1994). 
According to Rummel it can be defined as the murder of any person or people by a government, including 
genocide, politicide, and mass murder. 
34
 However in case the UN fails to protect the people, it loses its reason of existence. 
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instrument of the sovereign states. There are tensions between the popular sovereignty 
of the people, who the UN claims to represent, and actual member state’s sovereignty. 
Thus it is important to question how such an organization can legitimately represent the 
people. 
Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 reconstructed the theoretical foundations of the 
cosmopolitan argument for humanitarian intervention. This argument proceeded in two 
steps. Firstly, it was argued that there exists a duty to intervene in the name of the 
suffering people. Realizing humanitarian intervention as a duty would solve the problem 
of the international community’s lack of willingness to undertake it. Secondly, this duty 
is assigned by the people on the institutional schemes, which respectively have the duty 
to protect the victims of fundamental rights violations. 
4.5. A Cosmopolitan Humanitarian Intervention 
The normative nature of cosmopolitanism implies that it adopts a prescriptive 
approach to humanitarian intervention: it asks under which conditions and according to 
which principles an intervention with humanitarian ends should take place. Thus this 
section will discuss the central features about how cosmopolitans approach 
humanitarian intervention, by introducing and analyzing the criteria that agents should 
adhere to for their interventions to be considered legitimate. The central questions asked 
in this section are: (a) Which agent would be considered legitimate to authorize a 
humanitarian intervention? (b) Which agent would be considered legitimate to 
undertake a humanitarian intervention? (c) Under what conditions should a 
humanitarian intervention take place? (c) How should the humanitarian intervention be 
conducted? These questions are crucially important to have a clear account of when a 
humanitarian intervention would be considered legitimate according to 
cosmopolitanism and to map out the normative guidance cosmopolitanism offers for 
conducting humanitarian interventions. 
Before proceeding, it is important to analytically distinguish between two aspects of 
legitimacy. According to the first conception (a), a humanitarian intervention can be 
considered legitimate if the agent authorizing/undertaking is a legitimate authority. 
However according to the second conception (b), a humanitarian intervention can be 
 63 
considered legitimate if it has been authorized by a legitimate agent. In a similar vein, 
Dower (2009: 68 – 69) has argued, that an agent can be considered legitimate if the 
intervener is either (1) pursuing cosmopolitan goals or (2) authorized and/or constituted 
by a cosmopolitan authority. According to the first argument an intervener – a country 
or an alliance –, can be considered legitimately a cosmopolitan agent if it aims to 
promote the cosmopolitan principles and values (ibid.: 69). Thus the conduct of 
humanitarian intervention according to the cosmopolitan principles of justice and 
morality would be sufficient for an intervener to be legitimate
35
. A similar argument has 
been made by Farer (2005: 212 – 213) who claims that an intervention could be 
considered legitimately cosmopolitan if a state, out of “concern for strangers”, 
undertakes a humanitarian intervention. The main weakness of this argument is that it 
would leave to the state a task which is beyond the state (Archibugi 2009: 192): if the 
authorization of an impartial global institution would not be a necessary condition for 
considering an intervener legitimate, then interventions would proceed under states or 
their coalitions when the states have the political willingness or certain national interests 
involved. For an intervener to be to be considered fully legitimate by cosmopolitans it 
would have to not only accept the responsibility to protect, but make sure that this 
would take place through institutions considered legitimate for realizing those 
objectives (ibid.: 129). Thus an authorization from a legitimate institution would be 
necessary for an intervener to be considered legitimate according to the cosmopolitan 
account: as they argue, that an intervention can be considered fully cosmopolitan only if 
it takes place through the legitimate (cosmopolitan) institutions for realizing those 
objectives (Archibugi 2009: 192)
36
. Therefore, according to cosmopolitans, both 
assumptions (a) and (b) need to be met for a humanitarian intervention to be considered 
legitimate. 
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 Dower (2009: 68 – 69) at this point introduces the controversial examples of Tanzania’s intervention to 
Uganda 1979 and NATO intervention to Kosovo in 1999, which he argues had cosmopolitan aims. 
36
 This also reveals a significant difference between cosmopolitanism and just war theory: whereas the 
former argues for the importance of both external authorization and the legitimacy of the agent, the latter 
emphasizes only the right authority. 
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4.5.1. Who Should Authorize? 
The UN Charter Chapter VII (1945) gives an answer to the question who should 
authorize an intervention: the body to authorize any use of military force in 
international relations should be the Security Council. However cosmopolitans question 
the value of the current UN system and challenge the legitimacy of the Security Council 
(Held 2012: 157). On one hand, they criticize the UNSC susceptibility to the agendas of 
powerful states (ibid.: 158), which has led to selective compliance with the international 
norm of responsibility to protect. On the other hand, they argue that the unauthorized 
military interventions have weakened the UN’s normative authority: 
When the decisions of the Security Council are blocked, as in the Kosovo 
conflict, and when regional alliance like NATO acts in its place without a 
mandate, the fatal power differential between the legitimate but weak 
authority of the international community and the military capability of 
nation states in their own interests becomes apparent (Habermas 2007: 20). 
The cosmopolitans are highly critical of the UN in its current form, however consider 
it the most legitimate agent in the non-ideal world, as it represents the cosmopolitan 
values and principles. As was discussed in chapter three, Archibugi (1993, 2009), 
Habermas (2007: 173 – 174) and Held (2012: 249 – 252) have proposed extensive 
reforms to the UN to improve its effectiveness in handling humanitarian crises. The 
reform proposals focus on three points: the establishment of world parliament, the 
construction of a global judicial system, and the reorganization of the Security Council 
(Habermas 2005: 186). These reform proposals represent the ideal cosmopolitan 
institutional model for humanitarian intervention, however according to the non-ideal 
approach the UNSC is currently considered the most legitimate agent for authorization 
(although it is not considered formally a cosmopolitan institution)
37
. 
Before moving forward it is necessary to address one important counterargument. 
Moellendorf (2002: 121) has challenged the idea that a necessary condition for justified 
intervention should be that the intervention is sanctioned by the legitimate (higher, 
external) authority. Firstly, Moellendorf claims that legitimate authority has only 
instrumental value and can only be valued because “of the good of the international 
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 This is based on the argument developed in section 4.4.2: as the people have established a supranational 
institution to protect their fundamental rights, it follows that this body would be the most legitimate body 
to authorize a humanitarian intervention. 
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order” it results in. He states that “a world in which interventions occurred only if 
authorized would be more orderly one than one in which unauthorized, but otherwise 
just, interventions occurred” (ibid. 121). On this basis he argues that as legitimate 
authority lacks intrinsic value, the principle should be abandoned. Secondly, he argues 
that if the use of coercive powers can only be authorized by a legitimate authority, it 
may result in a situation where people’s rights are violated and an intervention that 
would be necessary to stop the violations is forbidden as it did not receive the proper 
authorization. (ibid.: 121) 
In order to respond to this critique, first of all, it is important to take into 
consideration that a proper authorization body is necessary in order to place the duty to 
protect human rights upon some agent. This argument necessitates the use of negative 
reasoning. From one hand, if there would not be an institution that would have the 
powers to authorize interventions, it might result in inaction, where the grave violations 
of human rights would continue to take place, but nobody would take on themselves the 
duty to protect due to lack of political will. From the other hand, interventions should 
proceed under proper authority as without this criterion, interventions would take place 
even when the necessary conditions for undertaking the humanitarian intervention are 
not fully met. Thus the authorization by a legitimate agent, even if it has only 
instrumental value, has very important implications precisely because of the order it 
results in. 
4.5.2. Who Should Undertake? 
The second question of who exactly should undertake the humanitarian intervention 
remains more unclear as “there exists unassigned responsibility to intervene, which falls 
on the international community in general but no one in particular” (Pattison 2010: 10). 
This reflects the gap between the supranational authority which has the legal right to 
authorize a use of force for humanitarian ends and the agent who actually has the 
monopoly of coercive powers, which is the state. Thus at present the undertaking of a 
humanitarian intervention remains contingent on the political will of individual states, 
states coalitions or regional organizations and the ad hoc contribution of their military 
forces. In order to clarify who exactly is the right agent to undertake a humanitarian 
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intervention, a clearer account of the conditions under which an agent can be considered 
legitimate is necessary. 
Pattison (2011: 398) has argued that the primary and necessary determinant of an 
agent’s legitimacy is its effectiveness38. This is a consequentialist approach, which 
focuses on the possible effects of a certain agent undertaking the humanitarian 
intervention
39
. The importance of effectiveness can be exemplified with the UNSC 
authorized intervention in 1993 into Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Bosnian war to 
create a UN safe haven around Srebrenica. In July 1995 Bosnian Serb forces invaded 
the safe area guarded by Dutch peacekeeping forces stationed there, and massacred the 
Bosnian Muslims, while the Dutch battalion – who were too few and too under-armed 
to repel the Serbians – retreated. This highlights that the intervention must not be 
merely legitimate, by having an UNSC authorization, but also effective while 
conducting the intervention to actually achieve the humanitarian ends
40
. Habermas 
(2007: 30) has assessed that after the “Srebrenica disaster” it became evident that the 
gap between effectiveness and legitimacy of peacekeeping operations should be closed.  
Thus this criterion – that an agent must be effective in order to be legitimate – has 
been developed based on the evaluation of the previous failures of humanitarian 
interventions. A different account would evaluate the agent’s legitimacy by considering 
the intentions of the agent (Archibugi 2004a: 4). Although the altruistic motive of an 
agent is a morally important quality, it does not have intrinsic value when it comes to 
the actual conduct of a military intervention. As Archibugi has argued, an agent can 
have the best intentions when intervening, but the events could evolve in unforeseen 
ways, and thus might cause more damage to the population it was intended to save (e.g. 
NATO in Kosovo 1999), while an agent with selfish intentions may succeed in bringing 
relief to the suffering people (e.g. Vietnam in Cambodia 1978, India in East Pakistan 
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 Pattison proposes the following three criterions that an agent intervening must possess to be considered 
an effective agent: (1) Internal effectiveness: this depends on the consequences for the intervener’s own 
citizens’ enjoyment of basic human rights. (2) Global external effectiveness: whether an intervener is 
likely to promote or harm the enjoyment of basic human rights in the world at large. (3) Local external 
effectiveness: whether an intervener is likely to promote or harm the enjoyment of fundamental human 
rights in the political community that is subject to intervention. (Pattison 2011: 399 – 402) 
39
 This condition is founded on the just war theory of ius ad bellum criteria that for a humanitarian 
intervention to be undertaken it must have reasonable prospects of success (Hehir 2010: 24). 
40
 Archibugi (2009: 183) has argued that the UN created safe havens in the ex-Yugoslavia represented not 
an effective military protection, but primarily a political protection. 
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1971, Tanzania in Uganda 1979) (ibid. 4 – 5). Thus it is possible to disregard agent’s 
intentions as determinant of legitimacy. 
Thus a proper agent to undertake the humanitarian intervention in order to be a 
legitimate agent, it must be first and foremost effective as an agent: there must be a 
reasonable expectation that an agent will be effective in conducting the intervention. 
Pattison (2011: 399 – 402) considers an intervener’s overall effectiveness as a necessary 
condition for an adequate degree of legitimacy, however for enjoying full legitimacy 
having merely effectiveness is not sufficient, as adherence to the principles of ius ad 
bellum and ius in bellum is a necessary for full legitimacy. These considerations will 
assist in clarifying who would be the most legitimate agent to undertake a humanitarian 
intervention in chapter five, section 5.1. 
An important implication of the division between the authorizing and undertaking 
agent is that from the cosmopolitan perspective a humanitarian intervention should 
never be unilateral (e.g. an intervention of a state), or even collective (e.g. an 
intervention of a coalition of states); instead it should proceed under democratic 
multilateral international or global political institutions (Archibugi et al. 2005; 2009; 
Kaldor 1998: 106)
41
. This implies two further conditions that need to be met for 
humanitarian intervention to be legitimate: first, the intervention should be multilateral; 
second, the agents should be democratic by nature. To support the first condition, 
Archibugi (2009: 192) argues that according to the cosmopolitan principles, states are 
not legitimate to decide on an intervention, as that authority is delegated to a global 
institution, to which the states themselves have delegated these competences
42
. Thus the 
authorization by a legitimate authority is necessary for a humanitarian intervention to be 
considered multilateral. To sustain the second condition, Archibugi (2009: 200) has 
argued, that the agent who would intervene should respect human rights internally, 
implying that only democratic states should undertake the intervention. Thus a 
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 Thus from a cosmopolitan perspective an unauthorized state or a coalition of states would not be a 
legitimate agent. This has led to the widespread condemnation by cosmopolitans of the USA’s 
unauthorized military interventions in Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003 (Habermas 2007, Held 2012, 
Pattison 2010, et al.), however controversially some cosmopolitans have approved the unauthorized, but 
multilateral NATO intervention in Kosovo 1999. 
42
 This is in stark contrast with Walzer’s (2002: 4) argument, who argues that in the absence of an 
international “fire brigade” to stop human rights violations, those who can, should intervene. 
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cosmopolitan humanitarian intervention would be conducted (1) multilaterally and (2) 
by democratic forces. 
4.5.3. Under What Conditions Should a Humanitarian Intervention Take Place? 
Cosmopolitan normative prescriptions about which circumstances should justify a 
humanitarian intervention derive from the just war ius ad bellum tradition (Archibugi 
2009: 192; Caney 2006; Moellendorf 2002: 118 – 122, et al.). Caney (2006: 248) has 
justified this in the following way: ”since humanitarian intervention (…) involves 
military action, one would expect the principles guiding military action employed to 
address internal wrongs (armed humanitarian intervention) to cohere with the principles 
guiding military action employed to address external wrongs (just warfare)”. Caney 
(2006) has developed one of the most elaborated contemporary account of the 
cosmopolitan approach to humanitarian intervention, regarding the conditions under 
which a humanitarian intervention can take place, thus it can be considered suitable for 
representing the contemporary cosmopolitan perspective. According to his account, a 
humanitarian intervention is legitimate when there exists: 
1) Just cause: a political regime violates people’s human rights. 
2) Proportionality: the costs incurred as a result of the intervention are not 
disproportionate in comparison to the internal wrongs which the intervention is 
supposed to address. 
3) A consideration of less awful measures (the least awful option): intervention 
(military or non-military) may be resorted to only having considered less awful 
options (e.g. diplomacy).  
4) Reasonable chance of meeting objectives: the intervention has a reasonable 
chance of succeeding. 
5) Legitimate authority: the intervention is authorized by a legitimate body. 
6) Reasonable costs: Intervention does not impose undue costs on the intervening 
authorities. This is important when instead of a right to intervene; there exists a 
stronger commitment as obligation to protect. He argues that when the costs are 
great, it might be more reasonable to conclude that external bodies are not 
obliged to intervene. (Ibid. 248 – 254). 
This approach the cosmopolitans have adopted will be problematized in section 4.6. For 
present purposes it serves as an example of the contemporary cosmopolitan account of 
the conditions under which a humanitarian intervention would be legitimate. 
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4.5.4. How Should the Humanitarian Intervention be Conducted? 
Traditionally, cosmopolitans emphasize that the intervention should be conducted 
according to the principles and methods of ius in bellum (Caney: 254 – 255). However 
what distinguishes the cosmopolitan thought is the nature of the intervention: a 
humanitarian intervention should not be conducted as a military intervention, but 
instead as an international police action for cosmopolitan law-enforcement (Archibugi 
2009: 197; Habermas 2007: 123 – 126; Kaldor 2013: 346). Van Hooft (2009: 139) has 
argued, that if the discussion about humanitarian intervention would take the form of 
„defending the rights of individuals from the predations of criminal tyrants, we can see 
it as an issue of policing“. Thus humanitarian intervention should be reconsidered and 
relabeled as a police action and should also be carried out as a police operation. Kaldor 
(2013: 345) has assessed that “the war over Kosovo illustrates the problem of using 
war-fighting techniques for humanitarian ends”43. Thus this approach limits the methods 
used in humanitarian intervention as, „(…) interventions are carried out in line with the 
methods and spirit of police operations inside democratic countries rather than with 
those of traditional military interventions“ (Archibugi 2009: 17). 
The idea is derived from the analogy between the “domestic” state level and 
international level: as the police maintains order and protects peoples’ rights in the 
domestic realm, the forces undertaking a humanitarian intervention should also be 
conceived as a police force and should use the methods appropriate to policing 
operations, as “a genuine humanitarian intervention ought to apply the same methods 
accepted within the borders of its own state” (Archibugi 2004a: 11). This police force, 
assembled from the nation-state forces, would be under control of the world 
organization, the reformed UN, employed in case of large-scale fundamental human 
rights violations (e.g. ethnic cleansing and genocide) as means of extrema ratio
44
, when 
it is proportionate and effective, and all other “less awful” options have been considered 
(Archibugi 2009: 193; Caney 2006: 202; Fine 2007: 83; Van Hooft 2009: 131; Smith 
2007: 75). 
                                                 
43
 NATO intervention to Kosovo in 1999 was considered controversial because of the methods used, as 
the air strikes collateral damage included civilian targets. 
44
 In Latin, last resort. 
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Archibugi has defended this idea through the example of a fire brigade: if a house in 
the neighborhood is burning, we can rely to a certain extent on those who are willing to 
help. However, it would be irresponsible if in a series of fires the community fails to set 
up an institution to handle the problem. As the fire brigade has the commitment to deal 
with fires and it is accountable to the people, it should be seen as the legitimate agent to 
handle the problem. Furthermore, it would manage fires more effectively then 
altruistically-minded neighbors. (Archibugi 2004a: 8 – 9) Currently the interveners are 
states, however a police unit, comprised of states forces, would not be influenced by the 
national interests of states, and thus would be the most effective agent for humanitarian 
intervention. Elliot has argued that for the global police force to be legitimate, „(…) the 
deployment of cosmopolitan force (and forces) first must be detached as much as 
possible from statist and Great-Power purposes and based on democratic and 
accountable international processes“. Secondly, the cosmopolitan force must be, by 
nature, and materially different from traditional military forces in their identity and 
value structures. (Elliot 2010: 302) If cosmopolitanism could overcome these 
difficulties, the global police force would enjoy full legitimacy. 
The world police force model has an intuitive appeal, but it must be approached with 
caution. The relabeling of humanitarian military intervention as a police action seems 
like a rhetorical move – as pouring old wine into new bottles –, thus it is important to 
question how much there is real contents and what it entails to conceptually substitute 
military intervention with police action. 
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Table 3 Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention (Source: the author) 
 ISSUE PROPOSAL 
a)  Which agent would be 
considered legitimate to 
authorize a humanitarian 
intervention? 
Must be authorized by a legitimate global institution, 
thus an authorization from the UNSC is necessary. 
b)  Which agent would be 
considered legitimate to 
undertake a humanitarian 
intervention? 
The agent undertaking the humanitarian intervention 
must be effective and adhere to the principles of ius ad 
bellum and ius in bellum. Must be undertaken 
multilaterally by democratic countries. 
c) 
 
Under what conditions 
should a humanitarian 
intervention take place? 
Humanitarian intervention should be undertaken if the 
ius ad bellum conditions are met: 
1) Just cause;  
2) Proportionality; 
3) A consideration of less awful measures (the 
least awful option); 
4) Reasonable chance of meeting objectives; 
5) Authorization by a legitimate authority; 
6) The costs are reasonable. 
d) How should the 
humanitarian intervention 
be conducted? 
1) A humanitarian intervention should be conducted 
according to the principles and methods of ius in 
bellum.  
2) The Humanitarian intervention would not be 
conducted as a military intervention, but as an 
international police action. This limits the methods 
used during the intervention. 
4.5.5. A Critical Perspective 
Smith (2007: 73) has argued that the cosmopolitans focus more on the ways in which 
humanitarian intervention would take place in an ideal world, rather than on the 
controversies that the current practice of humanitarian intervention has generated, thus 
cosmopolitans with their ambitious criteria are “anticipating a more cosmopolitan 
future”. He suggests that an evident drawback of cosmopolitanism is that the theory has 
mainly focused on developing an ideal account of how a humanitarian intervention 
should be conducted, however when evaluating the humanitarian interventions in the 
non-ideal reality, cosmopolitans have not always applied the principles in a consistent 
manner. Thus it is important to question whether cosmopolitans can maintain their ideal 
normative commitments when evaluating the real practice of humanitarian intervention. 
Here, model situations might reveal the theoretical limitations of cosmopolitanism.  
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A controversial case like the humanitarian intervention to Kosovo by NATO in 1999, 
which took place without UNSC authorization, can be used as a model case that shows 
the theoretical weaknesses of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitans are divided over the 
legitimacy of NATO’s intervention to Kosovo in 1999: some cosmopolitans, like 
Habermas (2007) and Pattison (2013) have defended the intervention, whereas others 
such as Archibugi (2009) and Kaldor
45
 (2013) have criticized it harshly. All thinkers are 
committed to the fundamental cosmopolitan principles and values, and thus would 
endorse the cosmopolitan prescriptions for humanitarian intervention as mapped out 
above, however have made different judgments about the cases of humanitarian 
intervention in the non-cosmopolitan reality. 
Habermas (2007: 29) has maintained that the Kosovo intervention got legitimized ex 
post
46
 mainly due to three reasons: 
(…) First, the aim of preventing ethnic cleansing, which was known at 
the time to be taking place; second, the erga omnes [obligations that bind 
all] provision in international law which mandated intervention to provide 
emergency aid in such cases; and finally, the undisputed democratic and 
constitutional character of all the states participating in the vicarious 
military coalition. 
Thus for Habermas the intervention was sufficiently justified under the ius ad bellum 
condition of the occurrence of large-scale human rights violations, which implied a duty 
to act, and by the fact that the intervention was undertaken by a democratic multilateral 
institution. Whereas Archibugi (2004a: 9) has maintained a more stringent interpretation 
of cosmopolitan principles and criticized NATO’s intervention in Kosovo for the 
unilateral decision-making and implementation, thus argued that “(…) the authority of 
the Security Council ought to be preferred to unilateral decisions taken by states or 
states alliances”. Thus in evaluating current cases of humanitarian intervention, 
cosmopolitans diverge on applying the normative principles: some adhere more strictly 
to the normative prescriptions; others adapt to the imperfect nature of the current world 
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 Kaldor has condemned the intervention of the basis of the conduct: „(...) the methods were much more 
in keeping with a traditional conception of war and had little connection with the proclaimed 
[humanitarian] goal“. According to Kaldor: „the cosmopolitan approach to the Kosovo crisis would have 
been aimed directly at protecting people“. (2013: 345) 
46
 Ex post facto (in Latin), meaning after the fact. This tern is contrasted with the term ex ante facto, 
which means, before a fact. In the context of the dissertation, these terms would obtain the following 
meaning: should humanitarian interventions be assessed for the intentions of the agent (ex ante) or for 
their effects (ex-post). (Archibugi 2004a: 4) 
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order and loosen the conditions set out above. This represents the difficulties that ideal 
theories face when prescribing principles to the non-ideal world. 
4.6. The Just War Approach to Humanitarian Intervention and 
Cosmopolitanism 
As mentioned in the previous section, cosmopolitan theorists, when addressing the 
conditions under which a humanitarian intervention would be considered legitimate, 
resort to arguments that are based on the just war theory. However one question that 
needs to be asked is whether cosmopolitanism is compatible with the tenets of just war 
tradition. Traditionally two elements are separated within the just war theory: (1) ius ad 
bellum, which means the rightness of waging war or going to war; and (2) ius in bello, 
the rightness of the manner in which one conducts the war (Dower 2009: 82). Before 
continuing the discussion it is necessary to outline the set of principles to obtain a better 
overview of the foundations of just war thinking. Ius ad bellum which refers to the 
conditions to be satisfied for going to a “just” war are based on the following criteria: 
a) The war must be declared by a legitimate authority: an established government 
or nation state; 
b) The war must be waged for a “just cause”; 
c) The war must be pursued with a right intention; 
d) War must be the last resort; 
e) There must be a reasonable prospect of success; 
f) The principle of proportionality must be respected; 
g) It is possible for the war to be fought according to ius in bello principles. (Hehir 
2010: 24) 
Van Hooft (2009: 132) has assessed that cosmopolitans would approve of the 
principles of the ius in bello doctrine, as the protection of individuals human rights is 
placed at the center of its concern. However problems arise when cosmopolitans resort 
to the principles of ius ad bellum, for justifying a humanitarian intervention, as the 
norms of ius ad bellum derive from a statist understanding on the international system. 
There seems to be a contradiction between the theoretical underpinnings of 
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cosmopolitanism and the just war tradition, as the latter is based on the claim that states 
are the only agents who have the right to wage a war, whereas the former questions the 
legitimacy of nation states (Hehir 2010: 34). As Van Hooft (2009: 138) has suggested, 
the key problem with this explanation grounded on just war principles is that: „by 
discussing the issue [of humanitarian intervention] under the rubric of the just war 
doctrine, it is framed by the question of when war is justified and conceptualized as an 
international issue centered on conflicts between states.“ Thus by adopting the 
framework of just war, cosmopolitans seem to be committed to the statist framework. 
It appears that a major weakness of the cosmopolitan approach to humanitarian 
intervention is the founding of the criterions of legitimate intervention on the pillars of 
just war theory. Lang (2010: 332) has asserted that what compels them to turn to an 
alternative approach are the difficulties that cosmopolitans face when making claims 
about the non-ideal world. It reflects an interior difficulty of the cosmopolitan theory: 
cosmopolitans argue for an ideal world, a type of “realistic utopia”47 of a peaceful 
international order that as a possibility could be achieved, however the vision is utopian 
since we are not there yet. In the non-ideal reality states are still the principal agents for 
intervening as their sovereign rights have not been given away to supranational 
institutions. The question of legitimate agent(s) for a humanitarian intervention obtains 
crucial importance here. If the just war tradition considers only states to be legitimate 
agents for using force in the international relations, then the cosmopolitan account of an 
ideal global order would argue, that political units (e.g. institutions or organizations) 
other than states should be considered legitimate bodies. Thus the incompatibility of the 
two traditions seems to undermine the cosmopolitan theory, as the category of just war 
is intrinsically connected to the statist understanding of world order and the nature of 
military intervention. This represents the dilemma about whether cosmopolitanism can 
accommodate the statist tenets of the just war theory, when discussing humanitarian 
intervention. 
As discussed above, traditionally the just war theory is underpinned by the doctrine 
that nation-states (or coalition of states) are the only legitimate authorities for using 
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 This expression can be traced back to John Rawls „The Law of Peoples“ (2001: 11), where he argues 
that „(...) political philosophy is realistically utopian when it extends what are ordinarily thought to be the 
limits of practicable political possibility and, in so doing, reconciles us to our political and social 
condition“. 
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force
48
. Dower (2009: 85) has argued that with this tenet the just war theorists have 
ignored the developments in the international law: “the UN Charter, to which all nations 
have signed up, (…) transfers the legitimate authority to the Security Council to wage 
war, only allowing nation-states an immediate right of self-defense if attacked (…)”. 
Thus cosmopolitans challenge the view that only states can have the legitimate 
monopoly of coercive means and argue that also other alternative political units – 
regional, trans- or supranational institutions –, can and should have that legitimacy. 
Thus they seek to widen the scope of legitimate use of force to agents other than states. 
In this way cosmopolitanism attempts to develop the just war theory: to adjust the 
theory according to the changing circumstances and opportunities of the globalized 
world. 
4.7. Summary 
This chapter explored a number of issues related to the cosmopolitan theories of 
humanitarian intervention. First, the normative foundation of the responsibility to 
protect was discussed in order to show that there exists a norm, which necessitates an 
intervention when large scale human rights violations take place. However, since the 
R2P fails to assign the duty to specific agent(s), it remains unclear, who exactly has the 
responsibility to protect. Second, this chapter proceeded to explore cosmopolitan 
arguments for humanitarian intervention and the conditions under which humanitarian 
interventions could be undertaken. This served to clarify the foundations of the 
cosmopolitan approach to the problem of humanitarian intervention and the conditions 
under which an agent could be considered legitimate. Cosmopolitans build these 
conditions on the principles of just war tradition, however section 4.6. adopted a critical 
perspective on whether cosmopolitanism can accommodate the statist tenets of the just 
war theory when discussing humanitarian intervention. 
On the basis of the discussion in this chapter it is possible to conclude that according 
to cosmopolitans the current institutions do not have the necessary legitimacy for 
humanitarian intervention and thus they propose extensive reforms of the current 
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 Dower has suggested that by limiting the monopoly of force to the states, just war theorists attempt to 
limit violence in the world in general as the world would be much more violent without such an ordered 
system (Dower 2009: 83). Thus by limiting the use of legitimate violence to nation states, just war 
theorists attempt to minimalize anarchy in the international relations. 
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institutions for the creation of new cosmopolitan institutions at the global level. Since 
humanitarian intervention as it is practiced at present is far from being ideal, 
cosmopolitans have proposed normative guidelines to increase the effectiveness of 
humanitarian intervention. 
A summary of the main findings and the principal issues which have arisen in the 
discussion of this dissertation will be provided in chapter five, section 5.1. and in 
section 5.2. these findings will be associated to the theoretical developments in the field 
of IR. 
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5. A RECAP OF FINDINGS 
The purpose of this thesis was to explore the question of humanitarian intervention’s 
agency from the theoretical framework of cosmopolitanism. This final chapter of the 
dissertation is divided into two parts, each of which presents the results relating to the 
two research problems. The first section will clarify the (1) normative guidance that the 
cosmopolitanism theory can contribute to the issue of an ideal agent for humanitarian 
intervention, whereas the second section (2) will clarify the role of the normative 
theories like cosmopolitanism in the field of IR. 
5.1. The Cosmopolitan Account of Agency for Humanitarian Intervention 
The purpose of this section is to draw some conclusions about the question of 
humanitarian intervention’s agency in the theoretical framework of cosmopolitanism. 
Cosmopolitans accept that the current world is state-centric and thus have developed a 
theory of humanitarian intervention for the non-ideal world, however they also propose 
an ideal cosmopolitan world order, where state’s sovereignty would be dispersed and 
transferred to higher levels of governance. The ideal institutional models of Archibugi 
and Held, Habermas and Pogge were explored in detail in chapter three, whereas the 
non-ideal theory of humanitarian intervention was explored in detail in chapter four. 
This leads back to the questions of who would be the most legitimate agent to (1) 
authorize and (2) undertake an intervention according to cosmopolitanism in the non-
ideal and the ideal cosmopolitan world. 
Cosmopolitans are critical of the un-orderly nature of the current practice of 
humanitarian intervention, where interventions are undertaken both unilaterally and 
multilaterally, with or without the UN Security Council’s authorization. Archibugi 
(2009: 194) has criticized this by arguing that if every state has different code of 
conduct, this would result in a return to the state of nature, where every government 
will retain the right to use force by its own assessment. As was discussed in chapter 
three, this has led to various cosmopolitan conceptions about the alternative institutions 
that should be established at the global level to enable a more orderly governance of 
these global questions; and chapter four presented the cosmopolitan normative guidance 
for conducting a humanitarian intervention in the non-ideal reality. Thus under the 
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normative perspective of cosmopolitanism the question of proper agency for a 
humanitarian intervention comes under a new light. 
According to the cosmopolitan institutional models proposed in chapter three, the 
agent to authorize a humanitarian intervention should remain the UN, however in a 
substantially reformed form. With regard to the agent to undertake the intervention, 
cosmopolitans argue for the establishment of a new international institution, who would 
perform the role of the police in the international system and whose main task would be 
to stop large-scale human rights violations (Pattison 2010: 4). This world police would 
be deployed by the UN in case of severe large-scale human rights violations. 
In chapter four, it was established that according to cosmopolitans, currently the 
most legitimate agent to authorize a humanitarian intervention would be the UNSC: 
„any intervention labelled humanitarian should not only be deliberated by UN 
institutions, but it should also be performed under the UN flag“ (Archibugi 2004a: 13). 
Even though cosmopolitans are critical of it in the present form, they consider it most 
legitimate as it is delegated by the people themselves to protect their rights in case their 
state fails to protect them. Secondly, it was argued, based on Pattison’s (2011) criteria 
of legitimacy, that an agent who undertakes the intervention should be the most 
effective agent. Thus the UNSC should prefer an agent about whom there is a 
reasonable expectation that it will be effective in conducting the intervention. However 
for an agent to be considered fully legitimate, it should also adhere to principles of ius 
ad bellum and ius in bellum. Furthermore cosmopolitans emphasize that a humanitarian 
intervention should only be undertaken multilaterally by democratic states coalition. 
Therefore within the framework of these conditions, it is possible to imagine that 
cosmopolitans would consider as preferred agent(s) to undertake an intervention a 
coalition of democratic states or an organization (EU, NATO etc.) under the 
authorization of UNSC. The cosmopolitan guidelines for a legitimate agent(s) for 
humanitarian intervention are best visualized in a matrix (see Table 4). 
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Table 4 Cosmopolitan Ideal and Non-ideal Theory of Agency for Humanitarian 
Intervention (Source: the author) 
 COSMOPOLITANISM 
Ideal theory Non-ideal theory 
HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION’S 
AGENT 
Who 
Authorizes? 
Reformed 
United Nations 
United Nations 
Security Council 
Who 
Undertakes? 
The UN police 
force 
Multilateral democratic 
forces (e.g. coalition of 
states or organization) 
 
Regardless of the intuitive appeal of the proposals, these accounts should be 
interpreted with caution as was indicated in chapters three and four. The cosmopolitan 
account of an ideal agent is founded on the idea that global issues as large-scale 
fundamental rights violations cannot and should not be handled by the state. As they 
consider states the primary violators of people’s human rights, they argue that states 
lack the necessary legitimacy for conducting a humanitarian intervention. However, 
since cosmopolitans recognize that in the non-ideal world nation-states are a persistent 
part of the international system, which possess the monopoly over coercive means, the 
states remain the primary agents for a humanitarian intervention. It is also important to 
take into consideration that the nation-states are the only proven effective protectors of 
the people from aggression – thus there is a reason why nation-states persist as the 
principal unit of the international system. 
The UN, which was established by the people and who thus has the people’s mandate 
to protect their human rights should be the most legitimate agent to authorize. However, 
as was argued in 4.4.2., the UN claims to represent the peoples, however in reality is an 
instrument of the states for the realization of their interests, hence it can be questioned 
whether the UN is a legitimate representative of the people. Thus both of the current 
agents for authorization and undertaking a humanitarian intervention could be 
considered inadequate from the perspective of cosmopolitanism. 
According to the ideal cosmopolitan conception, states’ sovereignty should be 
superseded and thus they argue for alternative authority structures for humanitarian 
intervention at the global level. From this perspective, it seems that humanitarian 
intervention can only be considered fully legitimate in the future cosmopolitan world. 
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As Smith (2007: 76) has suggested, “(…) a cosmopolitan world order needs to be 
established before humanitarian military interventions can be carried out”. From this 
perspective the practical and theoretical relevance of ideal theories like 
cosmopolitanism can be questioned. However it might be too early to “throw the baby 
out with the bathwater”: normative theories can offer theoretical guidance for the real 
world, thus it is possible to overcome this theoretical paradox, by understanding better 
the function(s) of normative theories. 
From normative theories like cosmopolitanism it is expected that their norms and 
principles would provide guidance for reforming our current international order. This 
was referred to in previous chapters as “normative guidance”, which should be 
understood in terms of action-guidance. Sangiovanni (2008: 220) suggests, that “the 
point of setting out systematic accounts of political values is to guide action”. 
Stemplowska (2008: 324) has supported this idea and sustained that the ideal normative 
theories, should first and foremost offer „(...) recommendations that are both achievable 
and desirable, as far as we can judge, in the circumstances that we are currently facing, 
or are likely to face in the not too distant future“. Thus a normative theory should 
provide (1) ideals we should be aspiring to and (2) give procedures of how to arrive 
towards those ideals. As was explored in chapter three and four, cosmopolitanism 
provides both an ideal theory of institutional models and a non-ideal theory of 
cosmopolitanism regarding the question of humanitarian intervention
49
. Thus, based on 
the discussion in this thesis, it can be concluded that cosmopolitanism satisfies both 
requirements for normative theory and thus it can be argued that cosmopolitanism 
provides normative guidance for the real world by establishing (1) the ideal to aspire for 
and (2) procedures of how to approximate that ideal. In this manner, the paradox of 
cosmopolitanism can be overcome: current institutions do suffer from a legitimacy 
deficit, however cosmopolitanism provides guidance for establishing more legitimate 
institutions and eventually reaching a more just international order. 
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 Stemplowska (2008: 326) has argued, that „(...) the debate over ideal and non-ideal theory should be 
understood as a debate over the function(s) of normative theory“. The function of the ideal theory would 
be to offer ideal solutions to the current empirical problems based on normative principles, whereas the 
function of non-ideal theory would be taking into account the non-ideal conditions of the existing world 
order and develop solutions based on those considerations. Seen in this way, ideal and non-ideal theory 
can be seen as complementary. 
 81 
This section began by describing the cosmopolitan account of humanitarian 
intervention’s agency from the ideal and non-ideal perspective and argued that, since 
the current institutions lack legitimacy, it seems that humanitarian intervention would 
have legitimacy only when the cosmopolitan ideal world order has been established. It 
went on to suggest that as the function of normative theories is to provide action-
guidance in terms of (1) establishing the ideal and (2) guidelines of how to reach the 
ideal. This implies that as according to cosmopolitanism the agents for humanitarian 
intervention in the real world lack legitimacy, they propose reforms to create ideal 
agents which would allow a much more effective protection of human rights. 
5.2. Ideal Theory versus Non-ideal Theory: Bridging the Gap in 
International Relations 
The cosmopolitan institutional proposals for re-conceptualizing and re-organizing the 
current world order outlined in chapters three and four have an intuitive appeal. At the 
same time, there is a widening gap between the international norms and the practices of 
the international community in the current global system. As there are fundamental 
changes taking place at the global level which require a unified political approach, 
cosmopolitanism, as a global political theory, provides useful responses for how to 
change the existing practices toward a more cosmopolitan order (Brown, Held 2013: 
288). Thus in this section I will consider the theoretical relevance and implications of 
cosmopolitanism as a normative political theory for the field of IR. 
Cosmopolitanism has developed into a rigorous political theory about international 
relations which offers institutional alternatives for the global order. Idealizations are 
inherent part of cosmopolitanism, when it discusses the issues of the ideal and non-ideal 
world. This has led to criticism from IR scholars about the feasibility and desirability of 
cosmopolitan projects, which has been formulated well by Zolo (1997: 15): „Can any 
cosmopolitan project ever be anything other than an inherently hegemonic and violent 
undertaking?”50 Thus IR scholars have remained blind about the theoretical value of 
cosmopolitanism. Beardsworth has asserted that “cosmopolitanism constitutes a 
normative theory in relation to the field of world politics, but its positions on specific 
                                                 
50
 Zolo (1997) in „Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government“ has written the most exhaustive realist 
critique of cosmopolitanism. 
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areas of this field are empirically meaningful (…) given growing dependence between 
states”. Thus a dialogue between the cosmopolitan ideas and IR theory is timely and 
fruitful. (Beardsworth 2011: 3) 
Normative theories serve to clarify the underlying norms of international relations 
and give normative guidelines about the institutional requirements necessary for 
achieving the ideal global order. In this way, normative theories guide the practice of 
the international relations. This gap is the most evident in the international human rights 
norms and the actual practices of the international community. A clarified account of 
the international norms that should be governing the global order and the institutional 
reforms required to meet those norms might lead to improvements in the actual practice 
of human rights protection. Thus the normative insights of cosmopolitanism are a 
necessary complement to the IR field. Instead of merely providing theoretical 
explanations about how the world is, IR scholars should seek to answer the normative 
questions of how the world ought to be. The theoretical value of cosmopolitanism lies in 
its ability to bridge that gap between IR empirical and normative reflection. The 
convergence of traditional IR theory and cosmopolitanism would lead to more 
normative IR theorizing
51
 that would give guidance about how the international 
relations should be.
52
 
                                                 
51
 An impressive attempt has been made by Beitz (1979) in “Political Theory and International 
Relations”, where he argues, that empirical science of international relations and the normative issues of 
international (cosmopolitan) theory are converging. 
52
 Developments in this area have been made by post-structuralist theorists in the field of IR, which is in 
some sense a form of critical cosmopolitanism – whereas remaing critical about cosmopolitanism, as such 
it approaches normative issues. 
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation is a work of political theory, which has investigated the question of 
humanitarian intervention’s agency from the theoretical perspective of 
cosmopolitanism. The aim of the thesis was to map out the theoretical framework of 
contemporary cosmopolitanism regarding the issue of humanitarian intervention and to 
explore its theoretical implications for the practice of humanitarian intervention. In light 
of the stated research problem, the dissertation explored the tensions between the ideal 
theory and non-ideal world. 
Returning to the problem statements posed at the beginning of this study, there were 
two main objectives. Firstly, to analyze the ways in which the cosmopolitan ideas can 
be applied to contemporary issues such as the problem of humanitarian intervention’s 
right agency and to investigate the difficulties cosmopolitan theorists’ face when 
applying their normative principles to the analysis of the issues of the non-ideal world. 
Secondly, to explore the role of cosmopolitanism as a normative theory in theorizing 
about the problems of our times and complementing the study field of IR. 
The findings of this dissertation make several contributions to the existing literature. 
The first chapter presented the principal variants of cosmopolitanism and the 
associations between the theories. The second chapter analyzed the cosmopolitan 
conception of sovereignty and found that cosmopolitan sovereignty can best be 
understood as popular sovereignty. The conceptualization of sovereignty as popular 
sovereignty enables cosmopolitans to legitimize the horizontal and vertical division of 
sovereignty between various political levels and thus justify the re-construction of the 
global architecture. The third chapter mapped out the institutional models of the leading 
contemporary cosmopolitan theorists: Archibugi and Held’s cosmopolitan democracy, 
Habermas’s postnational democracy and Pogge’s vertical division of sovereignty. A 
critical analysis of the ideal models revealed the weaknesses of the theories and it was 
questioned whether human rights protection would realize better if these institutional 
models would be implemented at the global level. The fourth chapter examined the 
cosmopolitan approach to the humanitarian intervention problem in the non-ideal world, 
presented the cosmopolitan arguments for the necessity of humanitarian intervention 
and the conditions under which, from the cosmopolitan perspective, a certain agent 
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could be considered legitimate, and analyzed from a critical perspective of the 
foundation of those conditions in the just war theory. The concluding chapter presented 
the findings of the research regarding the issue of right agent for humanitarian 
intervention based on the theoretical considerations of cosmopolitanism and their 
implications. The research findings suggest that despite the problems associated with 
applying a normative theory to the contemporary issues, they serve to (1) provide the 
ideals we should be aspiring for, and (2) give procedures of how to move towards 
ideals. Thus it seems justified to argue that the function of cosmopolitanism is to 
provide normative guidance that can help to bridge the existing gap between 
international norms and the practices of the international community. Therefore, the 
normative insights of cosmopolitanism are a necessary complement to the International 
Relations research tradition. The convergence of the traditional IR theories and 
cosmopolitanism would go beyond merely offering theoretical explanations about how 
the world is, but would also provide guidance about how the world and international 
relations ought to be. 
The contributions of this dissertation can be divided between two levels. The 
practical contribution of this dissertation consists in clarifying the legitimate agent(s) 
for humanitarian intervention and the conditions which need to be met for considering 
an agent legitimate. Based on the analysis it is possible to conclude that in the non-ideal 
world, the most legitimate agent to authorize a humanitarian intervention is the UNSC, 
whereas according to the cosmopolitans’ ideal the UN should be substantially reformed 
to be considered fully legitimate agent. The most legitimate agent(s) to undertake a 
humanitarian intervention in the non-ideal world would be multilateral forces (e.g. 
coalition of states or organization) composed solely of democratic states, whereas 
according to the cosmopolitans’ ideal, in the future a global police force managed by the 
UN would be the most legitimate agent. Here it is important to note that an 
authorization from the legitimate agent is a necessary condition for a humanitarian 
intervention to be legitimate.  
The theoretical contribution concerns the implications of applying an ideal normative 
theory to the problems of the contemporary issues. The theoretical exploration 
conducted in this thesis suggests that there are limitations involved when applying the 
ideal theory to the non-ideal world. On the one hand, the actual feasibility of the 
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cosmopolitan institutional models in the non-ideal world is questionable, on the other 
hand cosmopolitanism faces difficulties of applying its normative principles when 
approaching the problems in the real world. However it was suggested that normative 
theories can provide guidance for the real world, and thus are a necessary complement 
to the field of IR. 
This theoretical investigation was limited to the question of humanitarian 
intervention’s agency in the framework of cosmopolitanism to explore how normative 
theories can be applied to the contemporary issues and whether they can provide 
practicable guidance for the imperfect real world. The study has successfully clarified 
how cosmopolitanism can be applied to the problem of humanitarian intervention and 
demonstrated that cosmopolitanism does provide normative guidance for the real world, 
however future research on this topic is necessary and timely. Thus this study opened up 
new paths for subsequent research on: 1) the role of normative theories (e.g. 
cosmopolitanism) in bridging the gap between the norms governing international 
relations and practice of the international community; and/or 2) the investigation of the 
function and role of normative theories in the field of IR, by asking if and how a 
convergence of IR theory and normative theory is possible. 
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KOKKUVÕTE 
Käesolev dissertatsioon on olemuselt poliitteooria alane töö, mille uurimisobjektiks 
oli humanitaarinterventsiooni õige teostaja (agendi) probleem kosmopolitismi 
teoreetilises raamistikus. Uurimistöö eesmärgiks oli kaardistada kaasaegse 
kosmopolitismi teooriad seoses humanitaarinterventsiooni küsimusse puutuvalt ja 
uurida kosmopolitismi teoreetilisi implikatsioone humanitaariinterventsiooni praktika 
jaoks. Püstitatud uurimisprobleemi valguses käsitleti pingeid ideaalse teooria ja mitte-
ideaalse maailma vahel.  
Käesoleva töö alguses püstitatud probleemküsimuste põhjal oli tööl kaks peamist 
eesmärki. Esiteks, analüüsida kuidas kosmopoliitseid ideesid on võimalik rakendada 
kaasaegsetele probleemidele nagu humanitaarinterventsiooni õige teostaja küsimus ning 
välja tuua raskused, mida kosmopoliidid kohtavad, kui rakendavad oma ideaalseid 
normatiivseid printsiipe mitte-ideaalse maailma probleemide analüüsimisel. Teiseks 
eesmärgiks oli uurida kosmopolitismi kui normatiivse teooria rolli kaasaegsete 
probleemide üle teoretiseerimisel ja Rahvusvaheliste Suhete uurimistraditsiooni 
rikastamisel. 
Käesoleva dissertatsiooni tulemused panustavad mitmel viisil käesolevasse 
teoreetilisse diskussiooni. Esimene peatükk esitas kosmopolitismi peamiste variantide 
teoreetilised eristused ja teooriate omavahelised seosed. Lisaks käsitleti seniseid 
arenguid kosmopolitismi teoreetilises debatis humanitaarinterventsiooni teemadel. 
Selgus, et kosmopolitismi kaitsjatel puudub konsensus humanitaarinterventsiooni 
teostaja küsimuse osas. Teine peatükk analüüsis kosmopolitismi teoreetikute arusaama 
suveräänsusest ja leidis, et kosmopoliitset suveräänsust tuleks mõista rahva 
suveräänsusena. Suveräänsuse kontseptualiseerimine rahva suveräänsusena võimaldab 
kosmopolitismi eeskõnelejatel legitimeerida suveräänsuse jaotamist horisontaalselt ja 
vertikaalselt erinevate poliitiliste tasemete vahel ja seeläbi õigustada globaalse 
arhitektuuri ümberkonstrueerimist. Kolmas peatükk kaardistas kaasaegsete 
kosmopolitismi teoreetikute institutsionaalse mudelid – Archibugi ja Held’i 
kosmopoliitse demokraatia, Habermasi postnatsionaalne demokraatia ja Pogge 
vertikaalse suveräänsuse jaotuse. Nende ideaal-mudelite kriitiline analüüs paljastas 
teooriate nõrgad kohad ja osutas sellele, et inimõiguste kaitse ei pruugi realiseeruda 
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paremini kui need mudelid oleksid rakendatud globaalsel tasandil. Neljandas peatükis 
uuriti kosmopolitismi lähenemist humanitaarinterventsiooni probleemile mitte-ideaalses 
maailmas, uurides kosmopolitismi teoreetikute argumente humanitaarinterventsiooni 
vajadusest. Sealjuures kaardistati tingimused, mille alusel võib pidada kosmopolitismi 
kaitsjate perspektiivist teatud teostajat legitiimseks ja analüüsiti kritiilisest perspektiivist 
nende tingimuste seoseid õiglase sõja teooriaga. Viiendas peatükis esitati uurimistöö 
tulemused humanitaarinterventsiooni õige teostaja küsimuse osas, lähtudes 
kosmopolitismi teoreetilistest seisukohtadest ja nende implikatsioonidest. Uurimistöö 
põhjal võib väita, et vaatamata probleemidele, mis on seotud normatiivsete teooriate 
kohaldamisega/rakendamisega praegustele probleemidele, täidavad nad olulist 
funktsiooni, milleks on (1) pakkuda ideaale, mille poole peaksime püüdlema ja (2) anda 
suuniseid, kuidas nende ideaalid saavutada. Seega näib olevat õigustatud väide, et 
kosmopolitismi funktsiooniks on anda normatiivsed suuniseid, mis võivad aidata 
ületada praeguse lõhe rahvusvaheliste normide ja rahvusvahelise kogukonna praktika 
vahel. Seetõttu on kosmopolitismi normatiivsed sissevaated vajalik täiendus 
rahvusvaheliste suhete uurimistraditsioonile. Traditsiooniliste rahvusvaheliste suhete 
teooriate ja kosmopolitismi lähenemine üksteisele võimaldaks minna kaugemale pelgalt 
teoreetilistest seletustest selle kohta, kuidas maailm on, vaid suudaks anda ka suuniseid 
selle kohta, kuidas maailm ja rahvusvahelised suhted peaksid olema. 
Käesoleva dissertatsiooni tulemused võib jagada kahe erineva tasandi vahel. 
Uurimustöö praktiline panus seisneb humanitaarinterventsiooni õige teostaja/teostajate 
ja legitiimsuse tingimuste täpsustamises kosmopolitismi teoreetilises raamistikus. 
Analüüsi põhjal on võimalik järeldada, et mitte-ideaalses maailmas on kõige 
legitiimsem agent humanitaarinterventsiooni autoriseerimiseks ÜRO 
Julgeolekunõukogu, samas kosmopoliitide ideaalile vastavalt peaks ÜRO’d põhjalikult 
reformima selleks, et ÜRO’d saaks pidada täies ulatuses legitiimseks teostajaks. Mitte-
ideaalses maailmas, oleks kõige legitiimsem teostaja/teostajad 
humanitaarinterventsiooni läbiviimiseks multilateraalsed väed (nt. riikide koalitsioon 
või organisatsioon), mis koosneks üksnes demokraatlikest riikidest. Siinjuures on 
oluline märkida, et autorisatsioon õiguspärase teostaja suhtes on vajalik tingimus 
selleks, et humanitaarinterventsiooni saaks pidada legitiimseks. Samas kosmopolitismi 
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ideaali kohaselt võiks tulevikus olla ÜRO hallatav politseijõud kõige legitiimsem 
teostaja. 
Dissertatsiooni teoreetiline panus puudutab implikatsioone, mis on seotud 
normatiivse teooria rakendamisega tänapäeva probleemidele. Käesolevas töös 
läbiviidud teoreetiline analüüs näitas, et ideaalteooria rakendamine mitte-ideaalse 
maailma probleemidele on seotud teatud piirangutega. Ühelt poolt on küsitav 
kosmopolitismi teoreetikute institutsionaalsete mudelite reaalne teostatavus mitte-
ideaalses maailmas, teiselt poolt kohtab kosmopolitism raskusi oma normatiivsete 
printsiipide kohaldamises reaalse maailma probleemidele. Samas väideti, et kuna 
normatiivsete teooriate roll oleks anda suuniseid mitte-ideaalse maailma jaoks, on nad 
vajalik täiendus rahvusvaheliste suhete uurimisprogrammi. 
Käesolev teoreetiline uurimus piirdus humanitaarinterventsiooni õige teostaja 
küsimuse uurimisega kosmopolitimi teoreetilises raamistikus selleks, et välja selgitada 
kuidas saab normatiivseid teooriaid rakendada kaasaja probleemidele ja kas need 
teooriad suudavad pakkuda praktiliselt teostatavaid suuniseid (ebatäiusliku) reaalse 
maailma jaoks. Käesolev uurimus on suutnud edukalt selgitada/täpsustada kuidas 
kosmopolitismi saab rakendada humanitaarinterventsiooni probleemile ja näitas, et 
kosmopolitism suudab pakkuda normatiivseid suuniseid tegeliku maailma jaoks, kuid 
edasine uurimustöö nendel teemadel on vajalik ja ajakohane. Seega on antud 
dissertatsioon avanud võimaluse edasiseks uurimuseks järgnevatel teemadel: 1) 
normatiivsete teooriate (nt. kosmopolitism), roll rahvusvahelisi suhteid reguleerivate 
normide ja rahvusvahelise kogukonna tegeliku praktika vahelise lõhe ületamises; ja/või 
2) normatiivsete teooriate funktsiooni ja rolli uurimine rahvusvaheliste suhtete 
uurimisvaldkonnas ning kas ja kuidas rahvusvahelised suhted ja normatiivne teooria on 
ühildatavad: kas normatiivsem rahvusvaheliste suhete teooria on võimalik. 
